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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a criminal case, forensic science can answer the unanswered 
questions and tie up the loose ends.  DNA testing can tell us whose sweat 
is found in the gloves left at a crime scene.  Chemical analysis can tell us 
whether the powder found in a small bag is cocaine or baking soda.  We 
use fingerprint analysis to identify who has been in a stolen car and 
firearm and toolmark examination to identify whether a bullet casing at 
the scene of a homicide came from a specific gun.  As powerful as this 
evidence can be, unfortunately, it can be riddled with errors resulting in 
faulty or even completely false information going before a jury.  The 
errors can be unintentional human error, such as contamination at the 
testing stage or cognitive biases.1  They can be intentional human error, 
such as claims that items were tested and produced a certain result 
when no testing ever occurred.2  Or the errors can be foundational to the 
 
 1 See, e.g., Itiel E. Dror, A Hierarchy of Expert Performance, 5 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY 
& COGNITION 121, 122–23 (2016); Itiel E. Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better of Us: 
The Effect of Contextual Top-Down Processing on Matching Fingerprints, 19 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 799, 806–07 (2005). 
 2 See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Federal Prosecutors Question ‘Integrity and 




tbK1h5g (detailing a recent letter that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Columbia sent to city officials requesting further investigation into issues with the crime 
lab, including problems with the leadership of the lab); Nick Bunkley, Detroit Police Lab 
Is Closed After Audit Finds Serious Errors in Many Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/us/26detroit.html (discussing the closure of a 
Detroit police laboratory after an audit found that, among other issues, the laboratory 
was only in compliance with 42% of the “essential standards” when compliance with 
100% is required); S.P. Sullivan, State Police Lab Scandal Led to Major Overhaul in How 
N.J. Tests Drug Evidence. It Was All Based on a Lie, Lawsuit Claims, NJ.COM (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nj.com/politics/2019/02/state-police-lab-scandal-led-to-major-
overhaul-in-how-nj-tests-drug-evidence-it-was-all-based-on-a-lie-lawsuit-claims.html 
(discussing the falsification of drug test results by a New Jersey lab technician that led 
to a change in drug testing procedures in the state).  A recent review of the exonerations 
from 2018 revealed that a prominent cause of wrongful convictions was false or 
misleading testimony from forensic science experts, particularly where they 
exaggerated the degree of certainty to which they could testify.  See Exonerations in 2018, 
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Documents/Exonerations%20in%202018.pdf (discussing exonerations 
across the country in 2018 and patterns in the causes of wrongful convictions); Heather 
Murphy, A Leading Cause for Wrongful Convictions: Experts Overstating Forensic Results, 
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forensic science, such as bullet lead examination, which was once 
thought to be able to match a single bullet to a set of bullets but has been 
proven to lack evidentiary value.3 
Regardless of the cause of the error, faulty forensic science has 
devastating effects.  Of the 2,705 exonerations since 1989,4 almost a 
quarter of those cases involved faulty forensic science evidence.5  These 
numbers, however, do not account for the many wrongful convictions 
that will never be uncovered.6  The bottom line is that error is error.  
People are harmed whether the error is due to a lab’s gross negligence, 
a well-meaning forensic analyst overstating results, or a fundamentally 
flawed understanding of the science.   
These exonerations and the studies and analyses that followed 
have revealed some areas of forensic science as being particularly 
unreliable, including bitemark analysis and hair microscopy.7  Yet in the 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/us/wrongful-
convictions-forensic-results.html (discussing the issues with misleading forensic 
science in the trials of those wrongfully convicted and exonerated in 2018). 
 3 In 2004, the National Research Council released a report demonstrating that 
bullet lead examination, also known as Compositional Analysis of Bullet Lead (“CABL”), 
is not sufficiently reliable as standalone evidence.  See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC 
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE (2004), https://www.nap.edu/read/10924/
chapter/2#4.  Essentially, this report found that though bullets with a similar 
composition may have come from the same batch, these batches can be as large as 35 
million, making the evidentiary value almost nonexistent.  See id. at 6–7. 
 4 Exonerations in the United States Map, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-
States-Map.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2020).  This number is current as of November 15, 
2020, but it will continue to increase as more innocent people are exonerated. 
 5 Id. 
 6 For example, a recent study estimates that 4.1% of death row inmates would be 
exonerated if they remained on death row indefinitely—only 2.3% have, in fact, been 
exonerated (based on data from 1973–2004).  Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False 
Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. 7230, 7230–31, 7234 (2014).  The possible rate of wrongful convictions outside the 
death penalty context, however, is impossible to know because far less litigation occurs 
post-conviction in non-capital cases, and those cases often do not involve DNA evidence, 
one of the primary tools of identifying wrongful convictions.  “False convictions, by 
definition, are unobserved when they occur: If we know that a defendant is innocent, he 
is not convicted in the first place. . . .  As a result, the great majority of innocent 
defendants remain undetected.”  Id. at 7230; see also Jenny Roberts, The Innocence 
Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. REV. 779, 784 (2018) (exploring the new interest 
in wrongful convictions at the misdemeanor level and noting that “[w]ithout a doubt, 
the lower criminal courts convict many innocent people of misdemeanors”). 
 7 See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RSCH. 
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 42 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAS REPORT]; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS (2016), [hereinafter PCAST REPORT], https://obamawhite
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not too distant past, “experts” in these areas were testifying that they 
could match a strand of hair or a bitemark to a particular individual to 
the exclusion of all others,8 an assertion we now know to be false.  
Today, some of the very experts who previously testified to the 
infallibility of these “sciences” are the ones asserting they should not be 
used.9   
A 2009 report from the National Academy of Sciences (the “NAS 
Report”) found that before the use of DNA in criminal matters, which 
started in 1986, the only evaluation of whether forensic science 
evidence was reliable was cross-examination in the courtroom.10  
“[A]lthough the precise error rates of these forensic tests are still 
unknown, comparison of their results with DNA testing in the same 
cases has revealed that some of these analyses, as currently performed, 
produce erroneous results.”11  The resulting consequence is that 
innocent people are convicted of crimes they did not commit.12  
Even though hundreds of wrongful convictions have been based on 
faulty forensic science evidence,13 once-trusted forensic science is now 
known to have been based on mere superstition,14 and the scientific 
community is calling for caution when relying on this evidence,15 judges 




 8 This is called “individualization”: the ability to take an item and match it to a single 
source to the exclusion of all other possible sources, such as claiming that a fingerprint 
on a gun matches the suspect in a case.  Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming 
Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892, 892 (2005).  Fingerprint 
analysis, firearm and toolmark examination, bitemark analysis, hair microscopy, and 
DNA all purport to individualize (though DNA evidence is the only one to have the 
scientific evidence substantiating the claims).  Id. 
 9 See, e.g., Liliana Segura & Jordan Smith, Forensic Experts Fight Over the Problem of 
Junk Science, INTERCEPT (May 5, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/05/
05/forensic-evidence-aafs-junk-science (describing how Dr. Frank Wright, a forensic 
odonatologist, who previously touted the use of bite-mark analysis, has come to the 
conclusion that he was wrong). 
 10 See NAS REPORT, supra note 7 (discussing the lack of scientific scrutiny placed on 
forensic sciences developed in crime laboratories). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See id. at 42–43. 
 13 See e.g., Forensic Science: Problems and Solutions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://innocenceproject.org/forensic-science-problems-and-solutions (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2020). 
 14 David S. Caudill, Toward a Sociology of Forensic Knowledge? A (Supplementary) 
Response to Cole, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 583, 599 (2018); Mark Hansen, Long-Held Beliefs 
About Arson Science Have Been Debunked After Decades of Misuse, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/long_held_beliefs_about_arson_scienc
e_have_been_debunked_after_decades_of_m. 
 15 See e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 7. 
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cases where defendants face very serious charges.16  Not only are judges 
willing to admit this evidence but they will frequently do so after 
denying a defense request for a hearing on the admissibility of such 
evidence under either the Frye17 or Daubert18 standards and, more often 
than not, without any critical analysis.19  Judges are supposed to provide 
a gatekeeping function, but when it comes to forensic science in criminal 
cases, the gates seem to be perennially open.20  
One might assume that judges would be terrified of presiding over 
a trial that results in a wrongful conviction, particularly in a case where 
the stakes are high, such as homicide or sexual assault.  For example, 
Robert Lee Stinson was wrongfully convicted of sexual assault and 
murder based on faulty bitemark analysis.  Years later, the judge who 
presided over the trial, former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Geske, 
stated, “I think I did everything right at the time.  But that’s not to say 
that I don’t feel terrible.”21  She went on to explain that, at the time, the 
evidence was helpful to the jury, nothing said the evidence was not 
reliable, and it was relevant to the issues.22  Now though, after Mr. 
 
 16 Jane Campbell Moriarty, Deceptively Simple: Framing, Intuition, and Judicial 
Gatekeeping of Forensic Feature-Comparison Methods Evidence, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1687, 
1694–95 (2018) (“Despite robust challenges to [feature-comparison methods] evidence 
over the last three decades, courts have rebuffed nearly all claims . . . .”) (internal 
citations omitted); Jennifer Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic 
Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1213 (2010). 
 17 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing general 
acceptance as the standard for admitting novel scientific evidence).  For further 
discussion, see infra Section II.B.1. 
 18 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–95 (1993) 
(finding that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye standard of 
general acceptance in federal courts and establishing guidelines for trial courts to use in 
determining whether the scientific evidence in question is scientifically valid and can be 
properly applied to the facts of the case).  For further discussion, see infra Section II.B.2. 
 19 Though the federal system and some states use the Daubert standard for 
determining whether expert testimony is admissible, many states continue to use the 
Frye standard.  For a general discussion of how these standards are applied, see infra 
Section II.B. 
 20 See Deidre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 
TULSA L. REV. 381, 383 (2007) (noting that “the expert evidence of criminal prosecutors 
is subject to less scrutiny than that of criminal defendants, or than that of civil parties”).  
Several studies examining how judges evaluate expert testimony demonstrate that 
judges are more likely to admit evidence the prosecutor puts forward despite defense 
challenges, and where the defense seeks to admit expert testimony, the court is more 
likely to exclude such evidence.  See Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Comment, Trial Judges 
and the Forensic Science Problem, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1557–58 (2017) (discussing 
post-Daubert rates of success in challenging expert evidence). 
 21 Joss Fong & Dion Lee, False Positive, VOX (Feb. 14, 2019, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/2/14/18223871/wrongful-conviction-bite-
marks-robert-lee-stinson.  
 22 Id. 
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Stinson served twenty-three years for a crime he did not commit, she 
“felt bad . . . [and was] just grateful we don’t have a death penalty [in 
Wisconsin].”23  Justice Geske’s regret in response to presiding over a 
trial that resulted in a wrongful conviction appears genuine.  In decision 
after decision regarding forensic science evidence, however, judges do 
not appear concerned about the presentation of faulty forensic science 
evidence or that its presentation could result in yet another wrongful 
conviction.   
How is it that judges continue to allow these cases to go forward, to 
allow for the presentation of possibly faulty evidence, to risk 
participating in the conviction of a person who had nothing to do with 
the offense?  Quite simply, a courtroom might be the perfect storm of 
influences that compel a judge to follow the norm (admit the evidence) 
rather than appropriately deviate (prohibit the unreliable evidence or 
limit its admissibility).   
This Article explores whether pressure on judges to conform with 
their peers is a contributing influence on their decision-making 
concerning forensic science.  For the purposes of this Article, this 
pressure to conform is called the “conformity problem.”  The conformity 
problem is a phenomenon that has been documented in cognitive 
psychology experiments and demonstrated in economic and social 
science modeling.24  This Article hypothesizes that this conformity 
problem is a significant factor in judicial decision-making around 
forensic science. 
In this context, the problem goes beyond the requirements of 
precedent—as judges view decision after decision admitting forensic 
science evidence (the vast majority of which are nonbinding), the judges 
conform their decisions and similarly admit the evidence.  The 
conformity problem encompasses a complicated interrelationship 
among a desire to conform, personally held beliefs, and those who seek 
to influence judicial decisions.   
This conformity problem, however, is not irreversible.  Some 
judges’ personal characteristics may make them particularly open to 
forensic science challenges and willing to deviate from the norm.  Once 
those judges decide to limit or exclude the testimony, they open the door 
for other judges to deviate and eventually a new norm can be 
established.25  As groups of judges become more critical of forensic 
science evidence, these groups can influence other groups, then the 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1 and III.B.2, and Part IV. 
 25 See discussion infra note 226. 
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conformity problem will push judges to be critical of forensic science 
evidence.  Examining judicial decision-making from the perspective of 
the conformity problem is important because it provides a path toward 
ensuring that only reliable forensic science evidence goes before juries.   
The issue with judicial decision-making regarding forensic science 
in criminal cases is not that judges allow the evidence in when the 
evidence should always be excluded.  The solution is not the exclusion 
of all forensic science.  The issue is that most judges in criminal cases 
are not sufficiently scrutinizing this evidence or ensuring its reliability. 
This Article examines the problem of judicial conformity through 
the lens of a particular forensic science: firearm and toolmark 
examination (FTE).  This is for two reasons.  First, it permits comparison 
over a broad range of judicial decisions on a specific issue.  Second, FTE 
is an interesting area of forensic science because it is neither clearly 
reliable (like DNA evidence) nor clearly unreliable (like bitemark or 
arson evidence).  FTE has the potential to provide useful information to 
juries and judges, but studies have yet to establish the extent to which 
the information is useful. 
Part II provides context for the conditions in which judges make 
decisions about the admissibility and reliability of forensic science 
evidence, including summaries of government-sponsored reports and 
developments since 2008, a discussion of the Frye and Daubert 
standards as applied to these issues, and an introduction to FTE.  Part 
III provides the theoretical framework for the conformity problem and 
explores how it connects with judicial decision-making and forensic 
science.  Part IV then examines case studies of judicial decision-making 
that could provide evidence of the conformity problem.  This Part starts 
with an examination of State v. Henderson,26 a New Jersey case on 
eyewitness identification that resulted in a nationwide shift in how 
courts and advocates address this evidence.  It will then discuss a series 
of cases in the District of Columbia in which the law on FTE is slowly 
changing and two cases out of Massachusetts on FTE that have had a 
national, but not local, impact.  Finally, the Conclusion asserts that once 
a single court or series of courts changes its approach to forensic 






 26 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
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II.  HOW DAUBERT AND FRYE HAVE FAILED TO KEEP OUT FAULTY FORENSIC 
SCIENCE DESPITE EVIDENCE OF FLAWS 
Though the word “science” is in the name, science has played a very 
small role in the development of most forensic sciences.  Some do have 
roots in science, such as medicolegal death investigation and DNA.27  
[But] [t]he evolution of other forensic disciplines, particularly 
those related to pattern evidence, followed a different course, 
having been developed primarily within law enforcement 
environments or at the behest of law enforcement.  Disciplines 
such as fingerprints, firearms and tool marks, blood stain 
pattern analysis, tread impression analysis, and bite mark 
analysis matured largely outside of the traditional scientific 
community during a time when admissibility standards for 
scientific evidence had yet to be formulated.  Thus, 
admissibility of such evidence rightly or wrongly created 
judicial precedent in decisions that often did not, or could not, 
involve the level of research that would today be needed to 
establish scientific validity.28 
Neither the rigors of the scientific method nor a strict admissibility 
standard ensured that pattern-matching areas of forensic science were 
scientifically sound.  In 2009, the NAS Report concluded that “[w]ith the 
exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has been 
rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a 
specific individual or source.”29  This report examined almost all areas 
of forensic science, from fingerprint comparison to bloodstain pattern 
analysis to forensic odontology (bitemark analysis) to FTE.30  
Since the early 2000s, scientific and governmental bodies have 
grown interested in better understanding the validity of forensic 
sciences and their use in court.  Despite this interest and a growing body 
of evidence that forensic sciences can be faulty and unreliable, most 
 
 27 See, e.g., Suzanne Bell et al., A Call for More Science in Forensic Science, 115 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4541, 4542 (2018). 
 28 Id.; see also NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 42 (“The fact is that many forensic 
tests . . . have never been exposed to stringent scientific scrutiny.  Most of these 
techniques were developed in crime laboratories to aid in the investigation of evidence 
from a particular crime scene, and researching their limitations and foundations was 
never a top priority.”); Valena E. Beety, Cops in Lab Coats and Forensics in the Courtroom, 
13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 543, 543–44 (2016) (“Forensic disciplines arose out of crime scene 
investigations and law enforcement’s search for compelling evidence to convict.  In this 
unusual development, forensic results were not tested in a lab but rather in the field.  
Their reliability and importance were indicated by the rate of convictions for crimes, not 
by impartial scientific assessments.”). 
 29 NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. 
 30 Id. at xvi. 
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courts have continued to admit this evidence without substantial 
inquiry, irrespective of whether a court applied the Daubert standard or 
the Frye standard.31  To this day, this evidence is still going before jurors, 
often without limitation.   
This Part starts with an overview of select reports since 200832 that 
identify substantial reliability issues with several areas of forensic 
science, specifically the National Research Council’s Ballistic Imaging 
report (Ballistic Imaging Report),33 the NAS Report,34 and the 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology’s report on 
the scientific validity of feature-comparison methods (the “PCAST 
Report”).35  This Section is followed by a history of the Daubert36 and 
Frye37 decisions with a focus on how courts have evaluated forensic 
science within these legal frameworks.  The last Section evaluates with 
more specificity the reliability issues with FTE. 
A.  Reports on the Reliability of Forensic Sciences Demonstrate 
Substantial Problems 
1.  Ballistic Imaging Report  
In 2008, before the release of the comprehensive NAS Report, the 
National Research Council released a report on ballistic imaging.  This 
report originated from a 2004 request from the National Institute of 
Justice (a division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)) for a report on 
“the issues raised by the computerized imaging ballistic technology,”38 
and specifically to “assess the feasibility, accuracy, and reliability, and 
technical capability of developing and using a national ballistic database 
as an aid to criminal investigations.”39  
 
 31 See generally Jessica G. Cino, An Uncivil Action: Criminalizing Daubert in Procedure 
and Practice to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 651 (2016) (discussing the 
role of forensic science evidence in wrongful convictions, the standards of admissibility 
of such evidence, and issues that arise out of these standards). 
 32 This list of studies and reports is not exhaustive.  Other organizations have also 
studied these issues, including the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, which has released two reports on forensic science disciplines: one on latent 
fingerprints and the other on fire investigation.  See Forensic Science Assessments: A 
Quality and Gap Analysis, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., https://www.aaas.org/
resources/forensic-science-assessments-quality-and-gap-analysis (last visited  
Jan. 7, 2020). 
 33 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING (2008). 
 34 NAS REPORT, supra note 7. 
 35 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7.  
 36 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 37 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 38 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 2. 
 39 Id. at 1–2. 
KRONICK (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2020  11:28 AM 
598 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:589 
To conduct such an assessment, though, the committee writing this 
report had to understand (a) the mechanisms by which firearms leave 
markings on bullets and casings and (b) whether such markings are 
unique.40  “Very early in its work the committee found that this question 
cannot now be definitively answered.”41  The committee found that the 
markings left on bullets and casings were likely not completely random; 
thus, the committee had reason to believe that similar marks would 
likely exist on bullets and casings fired from the same firearm.42  The 
committee also found, however, that “the fundamental assumptions of 
uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not 
yet been fully demonstrated.”43  
The committee noted some of the challenges of FTE, including that 
the characteristics of a single firearm can change over time due to use 
and corrosion,44 bullets and casings can have markings that the firearm 
did not cause,45 and problems with the tool that most FTE examiners use 
to make comparisons.46  Compounding these problems, the committee 
noted that pressures on an FTE examiner to provide testimony helpful 
to the prosecutor resulted in FTE examiners expressing “their findings 
in bold absolutes—matches made to the same gun, to the exclusion of 
all other firearms in the world.”47  These statements, however, were not 
based on any studies or objective standards.  This report was the first 
comprehensive analysis of FTE and noted substantial issues with the 
practice. 
2.  NAS Report  
In 2009, shortly after the release of the Ballistics Imaging Report, 
the National Academy of Sciences released a report titled Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward.48  This report arose 
from a 2006 federal statute directing an examination of the needs of the 
 
 40 See id. at 3. 
 41 Id.  
 42 See id. at 81. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 33, 76–78. 
 45 See id. at 76–77 (discussing other marks that can be found on a bullet as a result 
of the “nonpristine nature of crime scene evidence”). 
 46 Id. at 63.  Many FTE examiners use a comparison microscope, which allows the 
examiner to simultaneously view the bullets or casings she is comparing.  Id.  Intuitively, 
one might assume that this would be a very helpful tool, but the comparison microscope 
is not as high quality a microscope as others, which can result in problems seeing the 
markings on the casings.  Id. at 63–64. 
 47 Id. at 67.  
 48 NAS REPORT, supra note 7. 
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forensic science community.49  In the three years between the creation 
of the committee working on the report and the issuance of the report, 
the committee heard a clear and consistent message: 
The forensic science system, encompassing both research and 
practice, has serious problems that can only be addressed by 
a national commitment to overhaul the current structure that 
supports the forensic science community in this country.  This 
can only be done with effective leadership at the highest levels 
of both federal and state governments, pursuant to national 
standards, and with a significant infusion of federal funds.50 
The report addressed not only the areas of forensic science that need 
additional research but also structural issues facing the field, such as a 
lack of governance.51 
Though a substantial part of the report focuses on the need for 
further scientific study of many forensic science fields, the report also 
addresses how problems can occur due to human error or fraud, 
including contamination or mislabeling; falsifying results or 
misinterpreting the evidence; failing to provide exculpatory 
information to the defense; or exaggerating results on the witness 
stand.52  Thus, even the most studied and substantiated areas of science 
can result in wrongful convictions without certain structural 
safeguards. 
In its evaluation of the various areas of forensic science, the NAS 
Report concluded the following: (a) DNA testing and laboratory 
chemical testing (such as testing used to determine whether a substance 
is a controlled dangerous substance) are scientifically sound;53 (b) 
though some scientific evidence indicates that fingerprints are unique 
to each individual, the evidence has failed to demonstrate that 
fingerprints can be sourced to a particular individual or distinguished 
among several individuals;54 (c) because the methods for analyzing 
 
 49 Id. at 1. 
 50 Id. at xx.  This conclusion was based on testimony the committee heard from 
stakeholders in the forensic science field including managers of laboratories, teachers, 
scholars, and members of the legal profession and law enforcement.  Id. 
 51 Id. at 77. 
 52 Id. at 45. 
 53 Id. at 133, 135–36. 
 54 NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 142–45.  This issue famously came to light when an 
FBI fingerprint expert incorrectly concluded that the fingerprints recovered from a 2004 
Madrid bombing belonged to Brandon Mayfield, a Portland, Oregon resident.  Jennifer 
Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 
1228–29 (2010).  Three separate FBI fingerprint examiners concluded that Mr. Mayfield 
was the source before Spanish authorities convinced the FBI that the actual source was 
another man with remarkably similar fingerprints to Mr. Mayfield.  Id. at 1229. 
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firearm toolmarks are not precisely defined, studies are necessary to 
establish that firearms leave unique markings;55 (d) hair microscopy 
(the matching of a particular hair with a particular individual), without 
accompanying DNA analysis, is not scientifically supported;56 (e) though 
it may be possible to individualize fibers and paints,57 no studies exist to 
date and the only reliable conclusion regarding comparisons of fibers 
and paints is that the fibers or paint could have come from the same type 
of item;58 (f) handwriting analysis may have value, though only limited 
research has been conducted;59 (g) assumptions that arson 
investigators made in the past have been shown to be incorrect, and 
more study is required;60 (h) though forensic odontology (bitemark 
analysis) can be used to exclude an individual, no evidence establishes 
that it can individualize;61 and (i) “the uncertainties associated with 
bloodstain pattern analysis are enormous,” but whether blood spattered 
quickly or slowly is determinable.62  What the NAS Report makes clear is 
that, other than DNA evidence and laboratory chemical analysis, 
substantial research is necessary to establish whether other areas of 
forensic science can actually do what experts have been claiming they 
can do for decades. 
3.  PCAST Report and the National Commission on Forensic 
Science 
In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology released a report on forensic science based on a review of 
more than 2000 papers and in consultation with judges, statisticians, 
FBI scientists, other forensic scientists and practitioners, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, academics, advocates, and agency representatives.63  
The report primarily examined six areas of feature-comparison forensic 
science:64 (1) DNA analysis of single-source and simple-mixture 
 
 55 NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 154–55. 
 56 Id. at 160–61. 
 57 To individualize means that a particular sample recovered from a crime scene can 
be conclusively matched to a single source: essentially, that a source has “individual” 
characteristics such that any item from that source can be traced directly back to it.  See 
supra note 8. 
 58 NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 162–63, 170. 
 59 Id. at 166–67. 
 60 Id. at 172–73. 
 61 Id. at 176. 
 62 Id. at 178–79. 
 63 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 17–19.  
 64 The PCAST REPORT defines “feature-comparison” forensic science as “methods 
that attempt to determine whether an evidentiary sample (e.g., from a crime scene) is 
or is not associated with a potential ‘source’ sample (e.g., from a suspect), based on the 
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samples,65 (2) DNA analysis of complex-mixture samples,66 (3) 
bitemarks, (4) latent fingerprints, (5) firearms identification, and (6) 
footwear analysis.67  The PCAST Report is largely responsive to the NAS 
Report, focusing on the issue that had not been addressed since the 
release of the NAS Report: whether forensic sciences have “fundamental 
scientific validity and reliability.”68 
In evaluating the six areas of forensic science, the PCAST Report 
made the following findings: (1) DNA single-source and simple-mixture 
analysis is foundationally valid, though errors can occur in particular 
instances due to practitioner error;69 (2) complex DNA analysis is not 
foundationally valid and more empirical studies need to be conducted 
to evaluate the validity of the forensic science;70 (3) bitemark analysis is 
not foundationally valid and the problems with this area of forensic 
science are so substantial that they are likely insurmountable;71 (4) 
latent fingerprint analysis is foundationally valid but has a substantial 
false positive rate and issues with application because of the subjectivity 
of the practice;72 (5) FTE is not presently foundationally valid, but with 
further study could be, though issues will likely persist because of the 
error rates and lack of adequate proficiency testing;73 and (6) footwear 
analysis is not foundationally valid and no empirical evidence supports 
the conclusions it purports to make.74  The report recommended the 
judiciary more substantially consider the scientific methods of the 
forensic sciences and limit the degree of certainty to which experts can 
testify.75  
 
presence of similar patterns, impressions, or other features in the sample and the 
source.”  Id. at 17–18.  This Article refers to such areas of forensic science as “pattern-
matching.” 
 65 A single-source DNA sample is one that includes DNA from only one individual.  
Id. at 70.  A simple-mixture sample is one where the DNA might come from two 
individuals, but one of the contributors is a known contributor.  Id.  Therefore, 
identifying the DNA profile of the unknown individual is “simple” because one of the two 
profiles is known. 
 66 A complex mixture is one where the DNA comes from multiple unknown 
individuals.  Id. at 75. 
 67 Id. at 7. 
 68 Id. at 39. 
 69 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 69.  See also supra note 65 for an explanation of 
single source and simple-mixture DNA profiles. 
 70 Id. at 82.  See also supra note 66 for an explanation of complex-mixture DNA 
profiles. 
 71 Id. at 87. 
 72 Id. at 95–96.  
 73 Id. at 111–12. 
 74 Id. at 117. 
 75 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 19. 
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In 2013, President Obama created the National Commission on 
Forensic Science, which included commissioners from varied 
backgrounds, including scientists, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
judges, and practitioners.76  The Commission was created to recommend 
“strategies for enhancing quality assurance in forensic science units.”77  
Former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions disbanded this Commission 
in 2017.78 
B.  Daubert, Frye, and Forensic Science 
To evaluate whether judges are appropriately admitting forensic 
science in the courtroom, one must first understand the legal standards 
that should be guiding these decisions: Daubert and Frye.  Though 
federal courts and many state courts have adopted the Daubert 
standard, Frye is still used in some state courts, particularly in the 
criminal context.79  
1.  Frye 
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia decided Frye v. 
United States80 in 1923, resolving the novel issue of whether expert 
testimony on the systolic blood pressure deception test (essentially a lie 
detector test) was admissible at trial.81  The court held that “when the 
question involved does not lie within the range of common experience 
or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special 
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular 
science, art, or trade to which the questions relates are admissible in 
evidence.”82  The court drew a distinction between testimony based on 
science that was demonstrable rather than merely experimental.  Noting 
that it was difficult to draw a line between the two, however, the court 
held that to be admissible, the scientific principle or discovery “must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field to which it belongs.”83 
 
 76 Jules Epstein, The National Commission on Forensic Science: Impactful or 
Ineffectual?, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 743, 748–49 (2018). 
 77 Id. at 748. 
 78 Id. at 743. 
 79 Cino, supra note 31, at 681–85.  Despite the liberty interest at stake in criminal 
cases, judges are more stringent in admitting expert testimony in civil cases than 
criminal cases, such as by applying different Daubert standards in civil cases than 
criminal cases.  Id. at 685–86. 
 80 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). 
 81 Id. at 1013. 
 82 Id. at 1014. 
 83 Id.  
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In jurisdictions that apply Frye to forensic science, challenging the 
admissibility of the evidence is particularly difficult.  Because courts 
have routinely admitted forensic science evidence in the past, “general 
acceptance” is an easy standard to meet.84  In the context of FTE, some 
courts find that Frye does not apply at all because FTE is not new or 
novel;85 other courts rely on precedent that FTE is generally accepted 
and therefore admissible under Frye.86 
2.  Daubert 
Frye persisted as the dominant standard for seventy years until the 
Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.87  
In Daubert, a case regarding the impact of an anti-nausea drug on birth 
defects, the Court held that revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
displaced Frye and established the following test for the admissibility of 
specialized testimony: “whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) 
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or 
 
 84 See JoAnne A. Epps & Kevin Todrow, Refryed Forensics: Screening Expert 
Testimony in Criminal Cases Through Frye Plus Reliability, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1161, 
1181–90 (2018) (discussing judicial recognition of general acceptance and jurisdictions 
that deny Frye hearings because of this judicial recognition); Paul A. Rodrigues, Toward 
a New Standard for the Admission of Expert Evidence in Illinois: A Critique of the Frye 
General Acceptance Test and an Argument for the Adoption of Daubert, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
289, 296–308 (2010) (finding that Illinois courts have relied on prior determinations of 
general acceptance, even where those determinations have been incorrect); Simon A. 
Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan? Self-Validation, Meta-Expertise 
and the Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
453, 539–40 (2008) (discussing general acceptance in the context of latent fingerprint 
evidence and how courts recognize general acceptance in the judicial community, 
therefore “turn[ing] a Frye analysis into an exercise in following legal precedent”). 
 85 See, e.g., State v. Goudeau, 372 P.3d 945, 982 (Ariz. 2016) (holding that a Frye 
hearing was not required for testimony that every bullet and casing retrieved was fired 
from the same gun because it was not a new form of testimony and Arizona courts had 
previously upheld its admissibility.); King v. State, 89 So. 3d 209, 228–29 (Fla. 2012) 
(holding that FTE is not new or novel, the court noted that “tool-mark identification in 
the context of ballistics has been used in the criminal context since at least 1929, and in 
Florida since at least 1937”); People v. Jones, 34 N.E.3d 1065, 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) 
(finding that defendant could not challenge expert testimony under Frye because 
“[f]irearm and toolmark identification is not new or novel”); Commonwealth v. 
Whitacre, 878 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“The comparison microscope 
technique has been in use since 1930’s and is an accepted methodology by the 
Association of Firearms and Toolmark Examiners . . . it is neither new nor original, 
rather the sort that is offered all the time.”). 
 86 See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 2 N.E.3d 383, 402 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that 
judicial decisions uniformly conclude toolmark and firearms identification is generally 
accepted and admissible at trial); People v. Givens, 912 N.Y.S. 2d 855, 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2010) (“This court was unable to find any cases where firearms and toolmark 
identification was found to be unreliable or no longer scientifically acceptable.  Nor were 
there instances where the testimony was ruled to be inadmissible.”). 
 87 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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determine a fact in issue.”88  To determine if the expert satisfies the test, 
the court undertakes a “preliminary assessment of whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue.”89  
The Court held that “the requirement that an expert’s testimony 
pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishe[d] a standard of evidentiary 
reliability,”90 whereas the need for the expert’s testimony to assist the 
trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact in issue went 
primarily to the relevance of that evidence.91  To assess reliability, the 
Court encouraged lower courts to consider whether the theory or 
technique can be and has been tested; whether the theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review and publication; the known or 
potential error rate of a particular scientific technique; and the existence 
and maintenance of standards controlling the operation of a particular 
scientific technique.92  The Court noted that general acceptance can be 
relevant to the reliability inquiry; though not required, the assessment 
permits “explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an 
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that 
community.”93 
Daubert should create a higher bar for the admissibility of forensic 
science evidence than Frye, particularly where the reliability of the 
evidence is in question.  In response to Daubert, courts have expressed 
a desire to avoid grandfathering in scientific principles that are no 
longer accepted,94 and the courts’ gatekeeping function, in theory, 
encourages hearings on the admissibility of such evidence.  In the 
context of FTE, for example, the hearings tend to relate to the reliability 
 
 88 Id. at 592. 
 89 Id. at 592–93. 
 90 Id. at 590. 
 91 Id. at 591. 
 92 Id. at 592–94. 
 93 Id. at 594.  Following the Daubert decision, the Supreme Court issued two 
subsequent decisions that, combined with Daubert, are known as the Daubert trilogy.  
Moriarty, supra note 16, at 1694, n. 48.  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme 
Court established abuse of discretion as the appropriate standard for an appellate court 
reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence.  522 U.S. 136, 
139 (1997).  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael established that a court’s basic gatekeeping 
obligation applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony.  526 U.S. 137, 141 
(1999).  
 94 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 123 (D. Mass. 2005) (“This 
reliance on long-standing use of ballistics evidence in the courts is troubling.  It runs the 
risk of ‘grandfathering in irrationality,’ without reexamining it in the light of Kumho and 
Daubert.  It arguably ignores the mandate of Daubert, especially where the courts are 
relying on pre-Daubert acceptance of a given scientific technique.”). 
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of the evidence.  In one particular case, United States v. Otero, the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey conducted a three-
day Daubert hearing on the defendant’s motion to preclude the 
testimony of the government’s FTE expert witness.95  In addition to its 
analysis under the various factors, the court noted that FTE is generally 
accepted in the forensic community and that other courts have admitted 
the evidence, even when those courts criticized the practice and the 
studies upon which the government witness relied.96  As the Otero case 
illustrates courts have been reluctant to change course when it comes 
to admitting forensic science evidence and have continued to 
grandfather in the evidence despite report after report urging courts to 
reevaluate this evidence.97 
C.  The Limited Reliability of Firearm and Toolmark Examination 
Pattern-matching forensic science98 includes the areas of forensic 
science in which a trained individual compares one or more samples of 
items and makes a subjective determination as to whether the items 
have sufficient similarities such that they likely came from the same 
source (or whether they are sufficiently different that one can be 
excluded from having the same source).99  Some examples of this area of 
forensic science are latent fingerprint examination, FTE, hair 
microscopy, and bitemark analysis.100  
The expert in pattern-matching forensic science is not relying on 
any specific and objective criteria in making these determinations.101  
The individual evaluating the evidence looks at it, thinks about the areas 
of similarity and difference, and then reaches a conclusion based on her 
prior experiences, training, and observations of what these pieces of 
evidence look like.102  The following rudimentary comparison helps 
illustrate why this is problematic: high school math students are told to 
“show their work” on homework and tests so a teacher can tell if the 
student got the right answer because of her work, chance, or cheating.  
On the other hand, if the student got the wrong answer, the teacher can 
tell from her work whether that is because she made a small 
miscalculation somewhere or if she simply does not understand the 
 
 95 849 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D.N.J. 2012). 
 96 Id. at 435. 
 97 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 98 The PCAST Report refers to pattern-matching forensic science as “forensic 
feature-comparison methods.”  PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 1; see supra note 64. 
 99 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 23. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 141. 
 102 See PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 48–50. 
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concept.  This allows the teacher to check the individual’s work—to 
make sure it is right for the right reasons and, if wrong, help fix the 
problem for the future.  The problem with these pattern-matching 
evaluations is that there is no objective way to evaluate whether the 
expert made the correct subjective determination or how she reached 
that determination.103 
The NAS Report and PCAST Report have found (or failed to find) 
varying degrees of support for pattern-matching disciplines.  Though 
bitemark analysis and hair microscopy have been widely discredited,104 
latent fingerprint evidence and FTE are among those that the NAS 
Report and PCAST Report acknowledge could have evidentiary support, 
should they be subjected to more studies and regulation.105  
FTE is premised on the idea that each firearm will leave individual 
and unique markings on the cartridge casings as they leave the gun.106  
These markings are allegedly unique because of the way that firearms 
are manufactured—as each firearm is produced, the tool that makes the 
firearm is dulled because metal is cutting metal; therefore, each firearm 
has markings slightly different than the firearm made before it.107  Then, 
when this firearm is fired, those features are imprinted into the casing, 
which has expanded and scraped against the inside of the firearm as it 
was fired.108  Other parts of the firearm, such as a spring called an 
“extractor,” can also leave marks on the casing.109 
When an FTE examiner obtains bullets or casings for examination, 
the current best-case scenario is that they follow the Association of 
Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) guidelines for 
examination.110  The AFTE specifies that an examiner should examine 
the casings using vision-enhancing tools, generally a microscope, to 
 
 103 The inability to easily check an examiner’s work can lead to widespread error.  In 
2008, Detroit shuttered its police lab after an audit demonstrated a “shocking and 
appalling” degree of error.  Bunkley, supra note 2.  Auditors found a likely 10% error 
rate in FTE—the errors were false positives, meaning that people were likely wrongfully 
convicted on this evidence.  Id.  Again, judges have continued to admit this evidence 
without scrutiny even after scandals like that in Detroit and reports like the 2009 NAS 
REPORT and PCAST REPORT. 
 104 See generally Saks & Koehler, supra note 8, at 892. 
 105 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 17–19. 
 106 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110 (D. Mass. 2005).  The intricate 
details of how firearms leave markings on bullets and casings are discussed in far 
greater detail in the Ballistics Imaging Report.  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 33. 
 107 Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 110. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id.  
 110 See United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 374 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding 
that the FTE expert could not testify because his methods were not consistent with the 
AFTE guidelines). 
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identify class, subclass, and individualized characteristics.111  Class 
characteristics are those that would identify the casings as having been 
fired by a particular type of firearm, such as a Glock, and individualized 
characteristics would be such that an examiner could say the casing 
comes from one specific Glock.112  Subclass characteristics are those that 
fall somewhere between class and individual characteristics, which may 
be unique to a particular set of firearms, but not an entire set of 
firearms.113  
However, studies have not substantiated that a firearm has 
individualized characteristics such that casings could have come from 
one and only one firearm rather than the firearm manufactured 
immediately before or after it or at some other time.114  The problem is 
that how an examiner decides what is a class characteristic versus a 
subclass characteristic versus an individual characteristic is neither 
standardized nor objective.115  The AFTE does not delineate the number 
of class, subclass, or individualized characteristics that the items being 
compared must have in common or must be different before the 
examiner can call it a match or assert exclusion.116  
Rather, under the AFTE method, the examiner may opine that a 
specific tool or firearm caused certain toolmarks when significant 
agreement exists between the two sets of marks.117  The AFTE goes on 
to define agreement as significant “when the agreement in individual 
characteristics exceeds the best agreement demonstrated between 
toolmarks known to have been produced by different tools and is 
consistent with agreement demonstrated by toolmarks known to have 
 
 111 Summary of the Examination Method, ASS’N OF FIREARM & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS, 
https://afte.org/resources/swggun-ark/summary-of-the-examination-method (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2020).  
 112 United States v. Johnson, No. 16 Cr. 281, 2019 WL 1130258, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019). 
 113 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 58. 
 114 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 17–19.  Part of the problem in determining 
individualization is that firearms are often manufactured by manufacturing parts of the 
firearm separately, then those parts are assembled, but not in order of when the 
individual parts were manufactured.  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 49.  Therefore, 
even though two firearms might come off the assembly line at the same time, their 
individual parts could have been manufactured at varying times.  
 115 See NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 141. 
 116 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 59–60 (describing the AFTE Theory of 
Identification, which does not include a requirement that a certain number of class, 
subclass, or individual characteristics must be identified in order to reach a particular 
conclusion). 
 117 NAS REPORT, supra note 7, at 153. 
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been produced by the same tool.”118  As the PCAST Report notes, the 
theory of AFTE examinations is “circular.”119  Essentially, and as AFTE 
concedes, the conclusions of these experts are subjective.120  
Three problems continue to persist regarding FTE: (1) no study has 
established the central premise upon which FTE is based—that the 
toolmarks on these casings are unique or the degree to which they are 
unique;121 (2) a dearth of studies establishing an error rate;122 and (3) 
FTE examiners have not been universally subject to proficiency testing, 
nor has the available proficiency testing been sufficiently rigorous to 
actually determine whether an examiner is reliable.123  That being said, 
even those critical of FTE admit that studies may eventually 
demonstrate that this area of forensic science is reliable to some 
degree—the problem is that those studies do not yet exist.124 
Despite these problems, which were identified more than a decade 
ago and remain unresolved, judges in courts across the country not only 
continue to admit this evidence but often do so without critical analysis.  
This is the case even when defense attorneys raise these concerns either 
in motions for Frye or Daubert hearings or during such a hearing.125  The 
question again becomes, why?  Why, in the face of so much evidence that 
forensic science must be rigorously tested before being admitted, are 
judges unwilling to put forensic science to the test?  
 
 118 AFTE Theory of Identification as it Relates to Toolmarks, ASS’N OF FIREARM & TOOL 
MARK EXAM’RS, https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 119 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 17–19. 
 120 AFTE Theory of Identification as it Relates to Toolmarks, supra note 118.  According 
to the AFTE theory of identification, “the interpretation of 
individualization/identification is subjective in nature.”  Id.; see also PCAST REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 17–19. 
 121 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. 
 122 Id. at 17–19.  In an extensive review of literature prior to 2009, the PCAST REPORT 
found no studies that accurately assessed the reliability of FTE.  At the time of the 
report’s publication, only one “appropriately designed black-box study” had been 
completed since 2009 on the reliability of FTE, which it considered insufficient to 
establish scientific validity and reliability.  Id. at 11.  
 123 See Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 367; Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the 
Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 
L. REV. 2, 26–27 (2005) (critiquing the use of declared rather than blind proficiency 
testing, and reports that laboratories spend more time obtaining results in declared 
proficiency tests than actual casework).  
 124 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 17–19. 
 125 See supra notes 86, 93 and accompanying text (discussing cases where judges 
have admitted FTE based on prior judicial decisions); see also United States v. Ashburn, 
88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying defense request for a Daubert 
hearing and, without independent analysis, finding that FTE evidence satisfies each 
Daubert factor based on prior judicial decisions). 
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III.  JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND THE CONFORMITY 
PROBLEM 
Given the critiques in the Ballistic Imaging Report, NAS Report, and 
PCAST Report, combined with the increased gatekeeping power 
provided under Daubert, one might expect to find judges substantially 
limiting the use of forensic science evidence.  This, however, has not 
been the case.  Cognitive biases, pressures to conform, false beliefs, and 
outside influence are surely impacting judges’ abilities to respond 
rationally to the new information about problems with forensic science.   
Judges are people like the rest of us: subject to the same biases and 
motivations that influence our abilities to make informed and correct 
decisions.126  “They are swayed by heuristic decision-making, 
friendships, beauty, the strength of a case, public opinion, fear of 
reversal, and the normal set of cognitive biases to which we all are 
subject: expectation bias, hindsight bias, confirmation bias, tunnel 
vision, and so forth.”127  Scholars from psychologists to law professors 
to economists have studied judges and how they make decisions.128  In 
many ways, the results are reassuring: judges tend to evaluate problems 
just like everyone else.  But that conclusion can also be problematic—
judges are tasked with making complex decisions that can substantially 
impact people’s lives yet are often using problematic decision-making 
shortcuts.   
Judicial decision-making is primarily a combination of internal 
processing and external influences.  Internal processing is studied 
largely through cognitive psychology.  Many studies and reviews of 
judicial decision-making have focused on cognitive psychology—how 
the brain processes certain information when making decisions.129  
 
 126 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) 
(citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 410 (1949)). 
 127 Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude: The NAS Report of Forensic 
Science and the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 317–18 (2010). 
 128 Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian D. Johnson, Organizational Conformity and Punishment: 
Federal Court Communities and Judge-Initiated Guidelines Departures, 107 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 253 (2017); Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, Judicial Conformity 
Versus Dissidence: An Economic Analysis of Judicial Precedent, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 405 
(2004); Guthrie et al., supra note 126, at 777. 
 129 See Cognitive Psychology, A.P.A. DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOL., https://dictionary.
apa.org/cognitive-psychology (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) (defining cognitive 
psychology generally as a “branch of psychology that explores the operation of mental 
processes related to perceiving, attending, thinking, language, and memory, mainly 
through inferences from behavior”).  See generally John N. Drobak & Douglass C. North, 
Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational 
Deliberations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 131 (2008); Guthrie et al., supra note 126; Guthrie 
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Without understanding the impact of external influences on internal 
processing, however, only part of the picture is painted.  Similarly, 
without understanding cognitive psychology, how external influences 
can have such a substantial impact on decision-making will remain 
elusive.  Thus, though this Article focuses on the external influences, 
understanding the internal processing through cognitive psychology is 
essential background for any evaluation of judicial decision-making. 
This Part first discusses the cognitive psychology research 
connected with judicial decision-making.  Against this backdrop is a 
discussion of the conformity problem and forensic science: the 
theoretical foundation of it and how it may be influencing judges to 
admit faulty forensic science in criminal trials without critical 
evaluation.   
A.  The Impact of Internal Cognitive Biases on Judicial Decision-
Making 
Judges rely on cognitive biases, sometimes called cognitive 
illusions or heuristics, in making decisions—these are shortcuts that 
allow people to take information, quickly analyze it, make a few guesses 
(the shortcuts), and then reach a conclusion.130  For example, with the 
cognitive bias “anchoring,” if a person is asked to guess how much a 
pencil costs and is told that the pencil costs less than $10,000, the person 
is likely to guess a higher number than a person not told about the 
$10,000 limit, even though it is preposterous that a pencil would cost 
even close to $10,000.131  People use that “anchor” of $10,000 as a 
shortcut to try to determine the cost of the pencil, and some might, 
perhaps unconsciously, assume that if $10,000 is mentioned, the pencil 
must be worth more than they otherwise would have thought.132 
In Inside the Judicial Mind, researchers surveyed 167 federal 
magistrate judges across five common cognitive biases: anchoring, 
framing, hindsight bias, representativeness bias, and egocentric bias.133  
As described above, anchoring is when one makes “estimates based on 
irrelevant starting points.”134  Framing is when one treats “economically 
equivalent gains and losses differently,” such as a person preferring to 
 
et al., supra note 128; Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 
Rutgers L.J. 1 (1998). 
 130 Guthrie et al., supra note 126, at 780 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974)). 
 131 Id. at 789.  
 132 Id. at 788. 
 133 Id. at 778. 
 134 Id. at 784. 
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buy something with a 90% chance of success rather than a 10% chance 
of failure—even though they are the same thing.135  Hindsight bias is 
when one perceives “past events to have been more predictable than 
they actually were,” such as believing that passing the California Bar 
Examination was an inevitability.136  The representative bias is when 
one ignores “important background statistical information in favor of 
individuating information.”137  For example, people often have a greater 
fear of a plane crashing than a car crashing, even though the latter is 
more likely because plane crashes are covered far more significantly in 
the news.  Finally, the egocentric bias is when one overestimates “one’s 
own abilities,” including whether one knows what the right outcome of 
a decision should be.138  
The researchers found that judges are susceptible to all five 
cognitive biases.139  In fact, judges are as susceptible to three of the five 
biases as the general population (anchoring, hindsight bias, and 
egocentric bias).140  They are less susceptible, while still being 
susceptible, to framing and the representativeness bias.141  Therefore, 
when judges are making decisions, they are likely using the same 
cognitive shortcuts that the general population uses in daily life. 
Another study from the same researchers found that judges 
primarily rely on intuition when making decisions, but such intuition 
could be overridden if the judges had a chance for subsequent 
deliberation.142  The researchers term this the “intuitive-override” 
process of decision-making.143  The researchers conclude that while 
intuitive decision-making can lead to accurate results,144 reliance on 
intuition can be particularly problematic in the legal system where 
“intuition is . . . the likely pathway by which undesirable influences, like 
the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system.”145 
 
 135 Guthrie et al., supra note 126, at 784. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id.  
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 787. 
 140 Id. at 816. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Guthrie et al., supra note 128, at 29. 
 143 Id. at 3. 
 144 Id. at 5.  
 145 Id. at 31.  The ability to make quick decisions, some of which can be accurate, was 
famously examined in Malcolm Gladwell’s book, BLINK.  MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE 
POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005).  This book examined our ability to make 
accurate, quick decisions, as well as why those decisions are sometimes wrong and how 
people can master making such decisions accurately.  See generally id. 
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Scholars have also applied judicial reliance on cognitive biases to 
decision-making in forensic science.  Professor Jane Campbell Moriarty 
argues that judges view decisions regarding admission of forensic 
science evidence as simple.146  Once a judge perceives the decision as 
simple, she is more likely to rely on the cognitive shortcuts described in 
the Inside the Judicial Mind study, which can lead to erroneous results.147  
Most forensic science determinations, however, are not easy—the 
method of examination, history of admission, and research in the areas 
are complex and require considerable attention.148  That judges view 
this evidence as “easy” to admit can be understandable given that 
prosecutors often frame the issue as, “this evidence has been admitted 
in virtually all courts for decades and has properly formed the basis of 
many convictions.”149  In addition, because many judges come from 
prosecutors’ offices, they may believe they have a firm grasp of criminal 
evidentiary issues, trust the prosecutors making these assertions, or 
have previously relied on the evidence when they were prosecutors.150  
Thus, they believe they can make more intuitive decisions. 
 
 146 Moriarty, supra note 16, at 1708 (“Courts have categorized FCM evidence 
admissibility as a simple problem and have avoided addressing the serious questions 
about its reliability.”).  In fact, in a District of Columbia Superior Court case, United States 
v. Tibbs, the judge presiding over the Daubert hearing noted,  
This discipline and the dispute surrounding it is more complex than 
it initially seems.  Full exploration of the issues surrounding the 
reliability of this evidence for at least a somewhat experienced judge 
to understand it required several days of testimony from multiple 
expert witnesses, close evaluation of numerous applied science 
studies, and some education or understanding of issues related to 
study design, statistics, and methodology, as well as advocacy by 
counsel on both sides, who are specially tasked by their offices to deal 
with forensic science issues.   
When I say it’s more complex than it initially seemed, before we 
had this hearing I thought this was something that we could deal with 
in an afternoon. 
Tr. of Daubert Hr’g., at 60, United States v. Tibbs, No. 2016-CF1-19431, 2019 D.C. Super. 
LEXIS 9 (Sept. 5, 2019). 
 147 See Moriarty, supra note 16, at 1704. 
 148 See, e.g., United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2010); Tr. of Daubert 
Hr’g., supra note 146 at 60.  In Willock, the magistrate judge who presided over the 
hearing on the admissibility of FTE testimony and the degree of the certainty to which 
the expert could testify not only reviewed several expert affidavits but also reviewed 
“many published studies, journal articles, and cases” in rendering his thorough report.  
696 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 149 Moriarty, supra note 16, at 1704. 
 150 See Clark Neily, Are a Disproportionate Number of Federal Judges Former 
Government Advocates?, CATO INST. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.cato.org/
publications/studies/are-disproportionate-number-federal-judges-former-
government-advocates (demonstrating that former prosecutors are appointed to the 
federal bench at a rate of 4:1 when compared with former defense attorneys). 
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These studies and analyses on the cognitive factors that influence 
judicial decision-making clearly demonstrate that judges are as likely or 
almost as likely as the rest of us to rely on cognitive biases, including 
when making decisions about forensic science.  Though these 
perspectives help explain part of the puzzle, judges are not ruling in 
vacuums—it is not just their individual cognition that impacts how 
judges rule.  Judges make decisions in the context of the criminal legal 
system—a community consisting of other judges, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, police officers, and other state and institutional actors.  The 
ties among these community members and their influence on each other 
is a substantial piece of the decision-making process. 
B.  The Relationship Among External Conformity Pressures, Judicial 
Decision-Making, and Forensic Science 
Just as we all often rely on cognitive biases, we can also fall under 
the spell of conformity and the pressures to adhere to a belief even in 
the face of conclusive evidence to the contrary.  This is the conformity 
problem.  From an evolutionary and practical standpoint, this makes 
sense: as we move through the world, our experiences lead us to believe 
that some things operate in a particular way.  This could be anything 
from a belief that money does not actually grow on trees or that purple 
cows do not fly through the sky.151  If someone comes to us and says, 
“Money grows on trees,” or “I just saw a purple cow flying through the 
sky,” we would rightly believe that the person was using hyperbole, 
kidding, or delusional.152  
This knowledge we gain is not only based on our own experiences 
but also on what we have learned from people around us whom we trust 
to provide us with accurate information.  Most everyone believes the 
earth moves around the sun—a belief that is not based on direct 
experience but based on what other people have told us.153  Because we 
trust those in our community, members of the same community tend to 
have beliefs that coalesce around each other, creating norms.  Many 
judges likely believe that pattern-matching forensic science is reliable 




 151 TALI SHAROT, THE INFLUENTIAL MIND: WHAT THE BRAIN REVEALS ABOUT OUR POWER TO 
CHANGE OTHERS 25 (2017). 
 152 Id.  
 153 CAILIN O’CONNOR & JAMES OWEN WEATHERALL, THE MISINFORMATION AGE: HOW FALSE 
BELIEFS SPREAD 8 (2019). 
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In the case of judges, studies have demonstrated that this 
conformity problem exists in the context of the federal sentencing 
guidelines.154  Researchers looked at the sentencing data for federal 
judges throughout the country, surveyed 262 federal district court 
judges, and interviewed 314 individuals involved in the federal criminal 
legal system (judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, etc.).155  The study 
found that within judicial communities, defined as the district in which 
the judge presides, there was considerable conformity for which 
individual-level predictors (such as the race, age, and/or gender of the 
defendant) could not account.156  For example, “downward departures 
[from the federal sentencing guidelines] were awarded in only 4% of 
cases in the Northern District of Mississippi, but they were meted out in 
31% of the cases in the Districts of Connecticut and Eastern New 
York.”157  Furthermore, judges within the same districts were more 
likely to perceive the federal sentencing guidelines in the same way: as 
either restrictive or normative.158  As this study demonstrates, judges 
are likely to conform their positions to those of their peers, both in terms 
of belief and practice. 
What if, however, we are not certain about the information?  Or we 
trust the wrong people?  Or everyone around us is wrong?  For years, 
people were completely certain that the earth was flat, that leeches 
could cure disease, and that a bitemark could be matched exclusively to 
a single individual—all of which we now know to be false.  Adherence to 
these beliefs and the subsequent ability to change them is a complex 
interrelationship among how firmly we hold a belief, how much we trust 
the person with the new information, and how our community may 
perceive a change in our belief.159 
False beliefs are “beliefs that are inconsistent with the available 
evidence, and which are even widely known to be inconsistent with that 
evidence.”160  In contrast, a true belief is one that “conform[s] with and 
[is] supported by the available evidence.”161  Two scenarios can arise 
with false beliefs: a person (1) genuinely believes the false belief; or (2) 
does not believe the false belief but because of the conformity problem 
will adopt the false belief.  Both scenarios are relevant to this discussion 
 
 154 Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 128, at 255–56. 
 155 Id. at 266–67. 
 156 See id. at 277. 
 157 Id. at 277–78. 
 158 Id. at 278. 
 159 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 25; Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 128. 
 160 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 7. 
 161 Id. at 43. 
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because, in either scenario, the conformity problem will be a roadblock 
to reaching and acting consistent with the true belief. 
A few areas of study regarding the impact of social factors on the 
formulation of true or false beliefs are particularly salient for our 
understanding of how judges make decisions about forensic science, 
around which this Section is organized.  First is a discussion of how the 
conformity problem operates, even in the face of evidence that the 
normative belief is wrong, followed by a discussion of how the strength 
of belief affects the ability to change.  This Section concludes by 
examining how individuals who wish to perpetuate the false belief can 
negatively and substantially impact the changing of a norm. 
1.  The Conformity Problem in the Context of Judicial 
Decision-Making 
The desire to conform, even if that means conforming with 
something antithetical to one’s beliefs, has been long understood to be 
a part of the human experience.  In a classic study on conformity from 
the 1950s, individuals in groups of eight were given cards that had one 
vertical line on the left and three vertical lines on the right.162  The lines 
on the right were of varying lengths, but one of the lines on that side was 
the same length as the line on the left.163  The individuals were asked 
which line on the right side was the same length as the line on the left 
side.  In the group of eight “participants,” one person was an actual 
participant in the study and the other seven were confederates whom 
the researchers instructed to answer the question similarly 
incorrectly.164  After hearing seven people give the same wrong answer, 
the subject, answering last, gave the wrong answer one-third of the 
time.165 
 
 162 Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of 
Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN: RESEARCH IN HUMAN RELATIONS 177, 177–79 
(Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951). 
 163 Id. at 180. 
 164 Id. at 178. 
 165 Id. at 181.  In a more recent study on conformity, subjects were shown a 
documentary and then given a test on what they remembered from the documentary.  
Micah Edelson et al., Following the Crowd: Brain Substrates of Long-Term Memory 
Conformity, 333 SCI. 108 (2011).  Days after this initial test, subjects were asked to recall 
the same information, but this time, half were presented with answers from their 
“peers” (this was a study manipulation, not from actual subjects or peers), all of whom 
gave incorrect answers.  Id.  Those subjects then gave the wrong answer 68.3% of the 
time, when they had previously given the correct answer.  Id.  In contrast, the control 
subjects were not provided with incorrect “peer” answers, and these subjects only gave 
wrong answers 15.5% of the time.  Id. 
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The participants in this study likely did not have a strong emotional 
tie to answering which line was as long as the other line, but 
nevertheless, in the face of clear evidence to the contrary, one-third of 
the people were willing to provide what they knew to be a wrong 
answer, just so they would be answering the same as the group.  People 
conform because it feels good; having a different belief than everyone 
around us is uncomfortable,166 even when they are complete strangers.  
Imagine how uncomfortable it is when you are saying that your peers 
have been deciding an issue wrong for decades, such as is the case with 
much of forensic science. 
The following example from nineteenth-century medical research 
is illustrative of the problems faced in trying to change judicial decision-
making about forensic science.  In 1846, a Hungarian physician ran an 
obstetrics clinic for a Viennese hospital when he realized that women 
who gave birth at his hospital died as a result of complications 10% of 
the time, while women at a neighboring midwifery clinic died of 
complications only 3–4% of the time.167  The doctor soon noticed a 
connection between his medical staff doing autopsies shortly before 
assisting with births and the death rate,168 so he mandated that the 
medical staff wash their hands before assisting with births.169  The death 
rate in this clinic plummeted and the Hungarian doctor published his 
findings in prominent medical journals.170  To the doctor’s surprise, his 
ideas about handwashing were rejected by other doctors despite the 
overwhelming evidence of their successes.171  The doctors, largely 
upper-class gentlemen, “were offended by the implication that their 
hands were unclean, and they questioned the scientific basis of his 
[conclusions], which did not accord with their theories of disease.”172 
This Hungarian doctor’s studies demonstrated that failing to wash 
one’s hands before performing a medical procedure could have 
substantial real-world consequences, including death, but doctors still 
ignored the information.  By embracing the studies, the doctors would 
be admitting that for decades they had been acting in a manner that 
jeopardized patient health.  And why would an individual doctor adopt 
this rogue doctor’s recommendations—the community of doctors was 
 
 166 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 84. 
 167 Id. at 77–78. 
 168 This was before we knew about bacteria and viruses, and before hospitals had 
signs about handwashing in every room. 
 169 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 78. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 79. 
 172 Id. at 78. 
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resolutely rejecting the recommendations.173  This is not unlike the 
circumstances surrounding forensic science; many people have been 
convicted, placed on death row, and possibly executed because of faulty 
forensic science.  Yet judges are still willing to admit the evidence today 
without critical analysis, even though they should have reason to believe 
the evidence is unreliable or, at best, has not been shown to be 
reliable.174  
Over the last fifteen years, judges generally have taken one of two 
positions regarding FTE: (a) the evidence is not flawed, and the judge 
will admit it without question; or (b) the evidence is flawed, but the 
judge will admit it anyway.  Judges in the first category, even when 
presented with evidence regarding the problems with FTE, will ignore 
the issues and permit the evidence to go before a jury without any 
limitations.175  Judges in the second category will admit the evidence 
with limitations, but the limitations are frequently meaningless to a jury 







 173 Id. at 84. 
 174 Judge Saris, a judge with a predisposition to want to engage with these issues, see 
discussion infra Section IV.C (discussing her decision in United States v. Monteiro), stated 
at a conference on evidentiary rules, “I am one of those judges who have, and I cringe 
now, let in bitemark identification, ballistic identification . . . .”  Advisory Committee on 
Evidence Rules: Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1463, 1535–36 (2018) [hereinafter Advisory Committee on Evidence 
Rules]. 
 175 United States v. Romero-Lobato, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1122–23 (D. Nev. 2019); 
United States v. Casey, 928 F. Supp. 2d 397, 400 (D.P.R. 2013). 
 176 An example of this is a judge permitting an expert to testify that a casing can be 
matched to a particular firearm to a “degree of ballistics certainty” rather than “100% 
certainty.”  See, e.g., United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(holding that a qualified FTE expert can testify to a “reasonable degree of ballistics 
certainty”); United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009) (holding 
that the expert may testify “within a reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms 
examination field”); United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 375 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(holding that if the expert meets the specified qualifications he or she may testify to a 
degree of “ballistic certainty”).  While this may be meaningful to the court, whether the 
expert says she is “100% certain” or is “testifying to a degree of ballistics certainty,” the 
jury hears: “The expert is certain that the casing matches the firearm.” 
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A common pattern emerges in many decisions that critique or limit 
FTE.  The judge often will spend several pages of the decision discussing 
the following problems with FTE:177  
1. FTE does not have known error rates; 
2. FTE is entirely subjective without any objective criteria; 
3. The primary peer-reviewed journal, AFTE Journal, does not 
have blind peer review and the publishers and reviewers have 
a financial stake in the continued use of FTE evidence in the 
courts;178 and 
4. No research has demonstrated the foundational premise of 
FTE: that firearm toolmarks can be individualized.179 
After describing these seemingly insurmountable problems, 
particularly under Daubert, the judge will include a paragraph or two 
similar to the following: 
While these critics of the science underlying ballistic toolmark 
analysis raise legitimate concerns about whether the process 
has been demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable to be called 
a “science,” the defenders of the process—and every federal 
court to have examined the issue in a written opinion (albeit 
with considerable differences in the amount of detail in the 
analysis)—have concluded that it is sufficiently plausible, 
 
 177 See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, No. 2:16cr130, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18606, at 
*16–17, *22–24 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2018) (allowing examiner to testify “to a reasonable 
degree of ballistic or technical certainty” in her conclusions despite the court, the 
government, and expert acknowledging the subjectivity of FTE); United States v. 
McCluskey, No. 10-2734 JCH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203723, at *26–29, *32–36 (D.N.M. 
2013) (concluding that insufficient data exists to determine a definitive error rate and 
noting the inherent subjectivity of FTE, but allowing examiner to testify “that she has 
reached her conclusions to ‘a practical certainty,’ or to a ‘practical impossibility’ of 
dissimilar origin”); United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13152, at *15, *23, *41–42 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (recognizing the issues in testing a 
technique that relies on subjective standards and inability to calculate a known error 
rate, but admitting testimony with the limitation that the expert can only make his 
conclusions to a reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field). 
 178 The Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) publishes the AFTE 
Journal.  What is the AFTE Journal?, ASS’N OF FIREARM & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS, 
https://afte.org/afte-journal/what-is-the-journal (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).  Though it 
claims to be peer reviewed, the AFTE Journal’s peer-review process is not comparable 
to that of a typical scientific journal.  See Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a 
Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 754–56 (2011) (discussing 
the failure of the AFTE journal to meet the standards usually associated with scientific 
publication, such as the lack of blind peer review, the selection of peer reviewers from 
AFTE members on the editorial board, and the limited dissemination of its articles to the 
wider scientific community).   
 179 This is not a comprehensive list of known issues with FTE, but this is discussed in 
more detail, infra Part III. 
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relevant, and helpful to the jury to be admitted in some 
form.180 
When presented with the evidence detailing the substantial issues with 
FTE, those issues are often jettisoned in favor of a position consistent 
with “every federal court to have examined the issue.”  The norm is to 
admit the evidence.   
Though some judges claim they are admitting the evidence because 
of precedent, precedent was not binding for most of these decisions.  
Some of the authority upon which the judges rely is persuasive, and for 
systemic legitimacy, relying on persuasive authority has benefits to the 
criminal legal system.  This argument for systemic legitimacy, however, 
does not justify the continued reliance on evidence that scientists and 
other examiners have found to be faulty.  In addition, Daubert is a case-
specific inquiry, designed to permit the exclusion of evidence if the 
evidence is unreliable in the case at issue, regardless of prior 
decisions.181  Furthermore, appellate courts review trial court decisions 
regarding the admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion.182  
Few appellate courts will overturn a trial court’s decision regarding 
expert testimony.  Therefore, though judges in these decisions 
frequently rely on precedent, often there is no binding authority 
requiring the admission of this type of evidence.   
Looking at the conformity problem from an economic perspective 
can be helpful: a person will change their belief when the cost of 
conforming to that belief becomes greater than the cost of changing that 
belief.183  A judge who has a preference for legal change or who has a 
strong belief that the state of the law is wrong is more likely to deviate 
from the norm.184  In 1970, Judge Skelly Wright deviated from the norm 
 
 180 United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536, 568 (D. Md. 2010). 
 181 See discussion of Daubert, supra Section II.B.2.  Courts have noted that evidence 
previously admitted under Frye is still subject to scrutiny under Daubert.  See, e.g., Coble 
v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 276 n.56 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (“[C]ourts do not ‘grandfather in’ 
expert testimony in a particular field or by a particular witness simply because the court 
has admitted expert testimony in that field or by that witness in the past.”); United States 
v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 118 (D. Mass. 2005) (noting that refusing to reexamine 
evidence previously considered to be generally accepted would be “equivalent to 
‘grandfathering old irrationality’” (citing United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68 
n.13 (D. Mass. 1999)); United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (D. Alaska 
2001) (“[T]he fact that [expert] evidence has been generally accepted in the past by 
courts does not mean that it should be generally accepted now, after Daubert and Kumho 
[Tire].”). 
 182 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (holding that the admissibility of 
expert testimony “is reviewable under the abuse-of-discretion standard”). 
 183 Harnay & Marciano, supra note 128, at 407–09. 
 184 Id. at 407; Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-
Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 33–35 (1994).  
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and found a warranty of habitability in rental leases—a warranty that 
had never previously existed.185  In so deciding, Judge Skelly Wright 
stated,  
I didn’t like what I saw, and I did what I could to ameliorate, if 
not eliminate, the injustice involved in the way many of the 
poor were required to live in the nation’s capital.  I offer no 
apology for not following more closely the legal precedent 
which had cooperated in creating the conditions that I found 
unjust.186 
The combination of how other judges will perceive a deviation from 
precedent, along with their personal view of how the case should be 
decided and the extra work necessary to deviate from precedent, will 
often dictate whether a judge will conform or deviate.187 
Thus, deviating is costly not only because it forces one to stand 
apart but also because it often takes more time and energy.  Judge Rakoff 
recently described the pressures of presiding over Daubert hearings:  
The problem with Daubert and [Federal Rules of Evidence] 
Rule 702 is that these hearings, if they’re done right, take a lot 
of time.  And judges are very busy and they always have more 
on their docket than they can handle in an ideal fashion.  I had 
a two-week Daubert hearing in a case.  It was fascinating.  I 
loved every minute of it, but who can afford two weeks on a 
single Daubert hearing?188 
To be clear, Judge Rakoff is predisposed to want to engage in evidentiary 
issues—he has served on committees addressing these issues and 
written about them.189  Even for him, though, paying close attention to 
these issues has a real cost.  Relying on the norm and just admitting the 
 
 185 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 186 Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and 
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 549 (1984). 
 187 Harnay & Marciano, supra note 128, at 407; Miceli & Cosgel, supra note 184, at 49. 
 188 Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, supra note 174, at 1537–38. 
 189 Jed Rakoff, COLUM. LAW SCH., https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/jed-rakoff 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2020).  Many of the judges who have issued rulings limiting forensic 
science expert testimony are judges who have a specialized interest in complex 
evidentiary issues and have served on committees, lectured, or written in the area.  In 
addition to Judge Rakoff, Judge Saris served on the PCAST advisory committee; Judge 
Gertner has written law review articles in the area; and Judge Grimm has served on 
committees and has spoken at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference urging trial judges 
to take more time to assess the admissibility of forensic science evidence.  Maria Dinzeo, 
Skepticism of Forensic Methods Urged at 9th Circuit Conference, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. 
(July 18, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/skepticism-forensic-methods-
urged-9th-circuit-conference/.  These are judges who are particularly interested in the 
area, willing to hear both sides of this issue, and more likely to change their beliefs. 
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evidence almost always has a lower cost to the judge in terms of time, 
energy, and conformity. 
Furthermore, judges may not have sufficient motivation to take on 
the costs associated with changing the way they approach forensic 
science.  Studies show that personal incentives can substantially impact 
whether a person is willing to deviate.190  For the vast majority of judges, 
the decision to admit forensic science evidence is not personal, just as 
the decision whether to wash one’s hands was not personal to the 
Hungarian doctors.  Without a personal hook in the decision, the cost of 
conforming remains low. 
2.  Forensic Science as a Strongly Held Belief 
Critical to this cost-benefit determination are (1) a person’s 
confidence in that old (false) belief, and (2) a person’s confidence in the 
new (true) evidence.191  Some beliefs are so ingrained in who we are as 
individuals that the new evidence and our confidence in that evidence 
have to be particularly strong to move us.  For example, a person’s 
religious affiliation is often a very strongly held belief.  Though one 
might not initially think the accuracy of forensic science would be a 
strongly held belief, it must be viewed in the context of the cases in 
which it is presented: “scientific” evidence presented by prosecutors 
and law enforcement to support allegations of often serious and violent 
offenses.192  Many judges do have strong beliefs in that context, 
particularly when judges have relied on forensic science for decades.   
For example, in Santa Clara County, California, a recent study 
examined five years of criminal jury trial appeals and found “a pattern 
of judicial conduct that favored prosecutors, with incidents occurring at 
nearly every step of the proceedings.”193  The Mercury News, a local 
newspaper, reviewed 727 cases, and in more than fifty of those cases, 
“judges allowed prosecutors to introduce questionable—and often 
improper—evidence.”194  In all, the paper found “more than 100 
 
 190 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 89–90. 
 191 SHAROT, supra note 151. 
 192 Political pressure on judges, even those who are not elected to office, strongly 
favors prosecutors and disfavors criminal defendants.  “In other words, to the extent 
that a trial judge facing an admissibility determination is influenced by political 
pressure, it is likely to push her toward admitting the evidence.”  Stephanie L. Damon-
Moore, Note, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1566 
(2017). 
 193 Fredric N. Tulsky, Part Four: How Judges Favor the Prosecution, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 
31, 2007, 10:36 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2007/01/31/part-four-how-
judges-favor-the-prosecution/. 
 194 Id.  
KRONICK (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2020  11:28 AM 
622 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:589 
instances when the appellate courts found that the trial judges erred in 
ways that helped prosecutors, and more than [forty] additional 
instances of troubling conduct that the appellate courts declined to 
assess.”195 
In addition, though most criminal cases have a defense attorney on 
one side and a prosecutor on the other, the judges very clearly tilt in one 
direction: on the federal bench, former prosecutors outnumber former 
defense attorneys four to one.196  At least in the federal courts, the 
chances are far higher that a forensic science issue will be before a judge 
who previously has relied on this evidence rather than before a judge 
who has challenged this evidence.   
These issues are exacerbated when one considers the likely impact 
of “belief perseverance,” a form of bias in which individuals hold onto 
initial beliefs even in the face of evidence that entirely contradicts that 
earlier belief.197  Furthermore, the longer a person holds a belief, the 
more difficult it is to change.198  In this context, judges who have believed 
in the reliability of forensic science for years and years, and particularly 
those judges who are former prosecutors, are likely to have a strongly 
held belief that forensic science is reliable and foundationally sound. 
Finally, once conformity shapes a person’s belief, the memory and 
brain can change such that even after the person is told that the basis of 
the original belief was false, the belief nevertheless remains unchanged.  
A study of the long-term impacts of conformity on the brain 
demonstrated that social influence perpetuating a false belief resulted 
in changes to the study subjects’ brains such that the subjects were 
resistant to reversing the impacts of the social influence even after they 
knew of its falsity.199 
This combination of familiarity with forensic science from a 
prosecutorial perspective, along with a history of belief in the reliability 
of forensic science, results in a judiciary that, in general, strongly 
believes that this evidence is reliable.  The difficulty of moving someone 




 195 Id.  
 196 Neily, supra note 150. 
 197 See Huang Shiyuan, Cognitive Biases That Lead to Wrongful Convictions: Illustrated 
by Twenty-Three Erroneous Chinese Cases, 54 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 108 (2018); Moriarty, 
supra note 127, at 320. 
 198 Shiyuan, supra note 197, at 108. 
 199 Edelson et al., supra note 165, at 110. 
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3.  The Role of Prosecutors in Maintaining the Conformity 
Problem 
Finally, a contributing factor to this conformity problem is the 
influence of prosecutors who seek to admit forensic science evidence in 
criminal trials.  The issue this Article seeks to address would not be a 
problem but for the prosecutors seeking to admit this evidence at trial 
and, significantly, asking that the prosecution experts be permitted to 
testify to unsupported degrees of certainty.  This directly contributes to 
the conformity problem because when prosecutors seek to perpetuate 
this false belief that forensic sciences are reliable, it gives judges a 
reason to hold onto that false belief and continue on the path of least 
resistance: maintain the norm and admit the evidence.200 
In the adversarial system that is the bedrock of the criminal legal 
system, each side is given an equal opportunity to advance and defend 
its position on issues.201  In addition, not only in the adversarial system 
but also generally, people prefer to give everyone’s opinion equal 
weight, even when the expertise is not equal on both sides.202  Therefore, 
a prosecutor advancing a position that is not based on scientific 
evidence will often receive equal weight when compared with a defense 
attorney armed with the PCAST Report, NAS Report, and any other 
applicable scientific articles or reports.  This is problematic because 
 
 200 The prosecutor’s influence may be further compounded based on her role in the 
criminal legal system and connection with the court.  The judge may come from the same 
office as the prosecutor now presenting such evidence for admission,  or even if not from 
the same office, the judge may have a lot of confidence in that prosecutor who is urging 
her to follow all the other judges and admit the evidence.  Compare United States v. 
Romero-Lobato, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1122–23 (D. Nev. 2019) (admitting testimony 
regarding FTE without any limitations), with United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 
536, 574 (D. Md. 2010) (preventing the firearms toolmark examiner from testifying to 
any degree of certainty).  The judge in Romero-Lobato served as a prosecutor for a 
decade before entering private practice and then becoming a judge.  Though the 
magistrate judge who presided over the Daubert hearing in Willock was a prosecutor for 
four years a few decades before taking the bench, he has developed a specialty in 
complex discovery and evidentiary issues since becoming a judge.  See Judge Larry R. 
Hicks, U.S. DIST. CT., DIST. OF NEVADA, https://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/court-
information/judges/judge-larry-r-hicks/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2020); Paul W. Grimm, 
District Judge, U.S. DIST. CT., DIST. OF MD., https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/paul-w-grimm-
district-judge (last visited Jan. 7, 2020); SDTX Bench Bar Conference Bio—Judge Paul W. 
Grimm, U.S. DIST. & BANKR. CT., S. DIST. OF TEX., https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/sdtx-
bench-bar-conference-bio-judge-paul-w-grimm (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
 201 Merely the fact that both sides are given equal time can be problematic when one 
side has evidence and science on its side while the other does not; it creates a false 
impression that both sides are equally supported.  See O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra 
note 153, at 158–60 (explaining how the “Fairness Doctrine” can distort public opinion 
on issues when two sides are treated equally despite a lack of equality in the evidentiary 
support for the opinions). 
 202 SHAROT, supra note 151, at 190. 
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though both sides are often given equal weight, the evidence supports 
just one side. 
This scenario, however, envisions this litigation happening under a 
best-case scenario: prosecutors and defense attorneys equally matched 
and equally armed with the necessary information.  Unfortunately, 
much of the litigation in criminal cases is not happening in this idealized 
courtroom.  In many cases, the defense attorney may not even be aware 
of the problems with forensic science or have the resources to contest 
the evidence.203  But even if the defense attorney is well-equipped to 
address forensic science issues, prosecutors still have an obligation to 
only seek admission of reliable forensic science evidence.204 
 
 203 Several law review articles have identified that many public defender offices and 
individual defense attorneys do not have the resources to contest expert testimony on 
forensic science issues.  See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science 
from the Ground Up, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 336–37 (2014) (discussing the 
disparity in access to and funding of defense experts); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. 
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 
89–90 (2009)  (discussing defense attorneys’ lack of knowledge and expertise in 
forensic science and the trial courts’ failure to appoint defense experts); Paul C. 
Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA 
World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1315–16 (2004) (discussing the need to appoint defense 
experts in all criminal trials because “[f]ew defense attorneys can deal with this type of 
sophisticated evidence . . . without expert assistance,” and the disparity between 
prosecution and defense access to and funding for experts); Mark Loudon-Brown, 
Garbage In, Garbage Out: Revising Strickland as Applied to Forensic Science Evidence, 34 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 894 (2018) (noting that a large caseload combined with a lack of 
familiarity with scientific issues often results in defense attorneys avoiding forensic 
science issues); Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 
262 SCI. AM. 46, 52–53 (1990) (discussing the lack of funding and time that defense 
attorneys have to address complex scientific evidence and the failure of trial judges to 
authorize funds for defense experts). 
 204 All lawyers have ethical obligations to avoid making false statements of material 
fact or law to the court or a third person.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3, 4.1 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2019).  Prosecutors are ministers of justice, not simply advocates and have 
additional special responsibilities and obligations to “see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that 
special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent 
person.”  Id. r. 3.8 cmt.  Prosecutors must “make timely disclosure to the defense of all 
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused or mitigates the offense” and promptly disclose credible and material evidence 
creating a reasonable likelihood a convicted defendant did not commit the offense of 
which they were convicted.  Id. r. 3.8; see also, Lara Bazelon, Ending Innocence Denying, 
47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393 (2018) (discussing the ethical obligation of prosecutors to act as 
ministers of justice and pursue exoneration when a defendant is convicted based on 
faulty forensic science evidence or proven innocent by conclusive forensic science 
evidence); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 
86 NEB. L. REV. 1, 20–30 (2007) (criticizing prosecutorial use of unreliable forensic 
science evidence and expert witnesses and advocating for a higher ethical standard 
requiring a prosecutor to fulfill an additional gatekeeping role and avoid the use of such 
unreliable evidence). 
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Cases involving forensic science are often serious violent crimes, 
and prosecutors’ desire to convict people for those crimes is 
understandable.  To admit or use forensic science, however, without 
first establishing its reliability can result in wrongful convictions and the 
factually guilty party remaining free to commit additional violent 
offenses.  For example, in the Robert Lee Stinson case, discussed supra, 
the newly discovered DNA evidence pointed toward another individual, 
Moses Price, Jr.205  Mr. Price ultimately confessed to the 1985 crime for 
which Mr. Stinson had been wrongfully convicted.206  At the time that 
Mr. Price was identified as the true perpetrator, he was serving a thirty-
five-year sentence for a 1991 murder—a murder committed after the 
offense for which Mr. Stinson was wrongly convicted.207  Using faulty 
forensic science to convict the wrong person can have serious ripple 
effects far beyond injustice of a the wrongfully convicted individual. 
Since the NAS Report and PCAST Report were first released, 
leading federal prosecutors have resisted their conclusions.  In response 
to the PCAST Report, former U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch 
(serving under President Barack Obama) stated:  
[The Department of Justice] remain[s] confident that, when 
used properly, forensic science evidence helps juries identify 
the guilty and clear the innocent, and the Department believes 
that the current legal standards regarding the admissibility of 
forensic evidence are based on sound science and sound legal 
reasoning. . . .  While we appreciate [the PCAST Report’s] 
contribution to the field of scientific inquiry, the department 
will not be adopting the recommendations related to the 
admissibility of forensic science evidence.208 
Former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions (serving under 
President Donald Trump), who disbanded the National Commission on 
Forensic Science in 2017, stated at the Senate hearing regarding the NAS 
Report, “I don’t think we should suggest that those proven scientific 
principles that we’ve been using for decades are somehow uncertain 
 
 205 Mike Johnson, Man Charged in 1984 North Side Slaying, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL 
(Apr. 3, 2012), https://archive.jsonline.com/news/crime/man-charged-in-1984-north-
side-slaying-8r54lrl-148613205.html. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id.  
 208 Adam B. Schniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science Report: 
More Sharks in Dirty Water, 126 YALE L.J.F. 348, 349 (2016), https://www.yalelaw
journal.org/forum/prosecutors-respond-to-calls-for-forensic-science-reform#_ftnref6 
(quoting Kira Lerner, Attorney General to Ignore New Report Finding That Commonly-
Used Forensics are Bogus, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2016)). 
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. . . .”209  Since disbanding the Commission, DOJ officials have continued 
to make comments providing blanket support for forensic science and 
attempted to discredit any challenge to such evidence.  Then-Deputy 
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein addressed the attendees at the 
National Symposium on Forensic Science in 2018:210 
Most of you work on the front lines of the criminal justice 
system, where forensic science has been under attack in 
recent years.  Some critics would like to see forensic evidence 
excluded from state and federal courtrooms. . . .  Critics argue 
that the methods have not undergone the right type or amount 
of validation, or that they involve too much human 
interpretation and judgment to be accepted as ‘scientific’ 
methods.  Those arguments are based on the false premise 
that a scientific method must be instrument-based, 
automated, and quantitative, excluding human interpretation 
and judgment. . . .  The effort stems from an erroneously 
narrow view of the nature of science and its application to 
forensic evidence.211  
Not only does Rosenstein misstate the concerns of the NAS Report, 
PCAST Report, the disbanded Commission, and other critics, he affirms 
the reliability of forensic science evidence in criminal cases in the face 
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.212 
Particularly in the case of the DOJ officials, it simply cannot be said 
that the prosecutors are ignorant of the problems with forensic science 
and the gross overstatements of reliability.  At the same time that then-
Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein was lauding forensic science, the 
DOJ was prohibiting FTE examiners from testifying that they can match 
ballistics to a single firearm to the exclusion of all other firearms.213  In 
 
 209 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions). 
 210 This was an event for local, state, and federal prosecutors co-sponsored by the 
DOJ, National Association of Attorneys General, and the National District Attorneys 
Association.  Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the National 
Symposium on Forensic Science, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-
delivers-remarks-national-symposium-forensic [hereinafter Deputy Atty Gen. 
Rosenstein]. 
 211 Id.  
 212 Much can be said, and has been said, about prosecutors’ responsibility to do 
justice and take a different, more just position when it comes to the admission of forensic 
science in criminal cases.  See supra note 204 for a discussion of prosecutors’ ethical 
responsibilities.  For purposes of this paper, it is the influence of these prosecutors and 
their stance that is directly relevant. 
 213 Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Firearms/Toolmark 
Discipline—Pattern Match Examination, U.S. DEPT OF JUST. (July 24, 2018), 
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addition, the FBI is currently undertaking the very studies that the NAS 
Report, PCAST Report, and other critics have demanded.214  The 
problem is that the DOJ wants this evidence to continue to be admissible 
while it awaits the results from the studies, even though it has no idea 
what the error rates are or how reliable the testing is.   
Furthermore, the DOJ is providing information to stakeholders, 
including judges, in ways that can be misleading.  For example, at the 
2017 Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 
a conference for judges,215 Ted Hunt, Senior Advisor on Forensic Science 
at the DOJ, claimed that the latent print study from the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) rejected the issues 
of foundational validity that the PCAST Report raised.216  Furthermore, 
he stated, “The PCAST approach . . . is not consistent with the scientific 
mainstream’s holistic approach to method validation that is embodied 
in the currently governing international standard.”217  These statements 
gave the impression that the PCAST Report’s conclusions are in direct 
conflict with the mainstream scientific community when, in fact, the 
AAAS report largely agreed with the PCAST Report—the title of the 
AAAS news release was: “Fingerprint Source Identity Lacks Scientific 
Basis for Legal Certainty.”218  Similarly, the PCAST Report concluded 
that, though the FBI is now undertaking appropriate studies of latent 
fingerprint examination, current error rates and foundational validity 
have not been established.219  
Creating confusion about the debate and asserting that both sides 
of the debate have evidentiary support increases the likelihood the 
judges will continue to rely on false beliefs; if a judge believes in the 
efficacy of forensic science evidence and the evidence to the contrary is 
uncertain, the judge is going to be even less inclined to change her 
position.220  This is a substantial contributor to the conformity problem 
because, as discussed above in Section II.A., a key consideration for 
whether a judge will deviate or conform is the relative economic cost.  If 
 
https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1083671/download; Deputy Att’y Gen. 
Rosenstein, supra note 210.  
 214 See Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, supra note 174, at 1484–85. 
 215 The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee of Evidence rules sponsored this 
Symposium.  Id. at 1463.  
 216 Id. at 1520.  
 217 Id. at 1521. 
 218 Anne Q. Hoy, Fingerprint Source Identity Lacks Scientific Basis for Legal Certainty, 
AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.aaas.org/news/
fingerprint-source-identity-lacks-scientific-basis-legal-certainty. 
 219 PCAST REPORT, supra note 7, at 17–19.  
 220 See O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 158–60. 
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prosecutors make it seem as though the reliability of forensic science is 
a contested issue, the economic cost of maintaining the norm, the 
position for which the prosecutor is advocating, becomes lower.  If the 
prosecutor admits that the forensic expert should be limited in their 
testimony, then the economic cost of deviating is lower.221 
One could compare the actions of those prosecutors who know that 
forensic science is flawed and yet still seek its admission with the 
actions of cigarette companies, which have attempted to obfuscate the 
connection between smoking and cancer since the 1950s.  Just as 
smoking is a public health issue that can result in serious health 
consequences, flawed forensic science can result in wrongful 
convictions and substantial losses of liberty.  After a Reader’s Digest 
article in 1952 demonstrated a link between cigarette smoking and lung 
cancer (and there was a massive sell-off of stock in tobacco companies), 
the tobacco companies created the “Tobacco Strategy.”222  “The goal was 
. . . to create the appearance of uncertainty: to find, fund, and promote 
research that muddied the waters, made the existing evidence seem less 
definitive, and gave policy makers and tobacco users just enough cover 
to ignore the scientific consensus.”223  
This is substantially like what some prosecutors are doing around 
forensic science.  Sowing a climate of confusion and uncertainty 
regarding the reliability of this evidence is very similar to what tobacco 
companies attempted to do with the link between cancer and smoking—
if people are unsure of the connection, they will feel comfortable relying 
upon the previously held belief and are unlikely to change course.224  
Furthermore, because some prosecutors continue to perpetuate this 
idea that there is a debate as to the efficacy of these areas of forensic 
science, both “sides” to the debate receive equal attention,225 and judges 
will continue to view the choices as having equal bases in evidence. 
Thus, the conformity problem persists where judges feel pressure 
to go along with their peers, they believe strongly in the reliability of 
forensic science, and prosecutors regularly attempt to create a false 
sense of equality in the debate over these issues.  For most judges, the 
cost of deviating in these circumstances is high.  Some judges, however, 
are not so inclined.  Finding those judges, convincing those judges, and 
 
 221 Some forensic science evidence, such as bitemark analysis, should not be 
introduced at all.  If prosecutors cease asking judges to admit this evidence, then judges 
will not have to grapple with whether to admit the evidence. 
 222 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 93–95. 
 223 Id. at 95. 
 224 See id. at 101–02. 
 225 Id. at 157–59. 
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getting favorable rulings over and over and over again is how the 
conformity problem can start working in favor of the true belief, rather 
than the false belief. 
IV.  INSTANCES OF THE CONFORMITY PROBLEM IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING  
The conformity problem may be pushing judges to admit FTE 
evidence even when the judge has concerns about doing so.  The 
thinking is, “If every other judge is admitting it, why shouldn’t I?”  If 
enough judges start to deviate, though, and substantially limit or 
exclude the evidence, the norm can change, and the conformity problem 
is no longer a problem.226  This Part demonstrates that once courts—
even a small number of them—start deviating from the norm, other 
courts will follow.   
In mid-1600s England, smallpox was prevalent, and for twenty to 
sixty percent of the people who contracted it, it was fatal.227  One woman 
in the British aristocracy, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, had contracted 
smallpox in her twenties.  Even though she survived, she was horribly 
scarred and lost her brother to the disease.228  Soon after, Lady Mary 
traveled to Turkey where she learned of smallpox variolation, which is 
not dissimilar from today’s vaccines.  Variolation caused sickness and 
possible death in a small percentage of people, but for the vast majority, 
it would make them immune to smallpox.229  Lady Mary was thrilled 
with this discovery and tried to bring variolation back to England.230  
Once back in England, however, no one wanted to listen to Lady Mary 
about variolation; not only was this a foreign procedure but a woman 
 
 226 In a study on how pressure to conform impacts memory, the authors created 
several conditions: one in which all the peers incorrectly disagreed with the subject’s 
answer; one in which some but not all of the peers incorrectly disagreed with the 
subject’s answer; and one in which no information was provided about peer answers.  
Micah Edelson et al., Brain Substrates of Recovery from Misleading Influence, 34 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 7744, 7745 (2014) (another group in the study was provided random, 
computer generated answers, but this condition is not relevant to the instant 
discussion).  The subjects who were told that their peers unanimously disagreed with 
their answer changed their answer to the incorrect answer 68.3% of the time.  Id. 
at 7747–48.  Those who were told nothing about their peers changed their answer to 
the incorrect answer 15.5% of the time.  Id. at 7748.  Those who were told some peers 
had the incorrect answer and some had the same answer provided the incorrect answer 
11.8% of the time.  Id.  This study demonstrates that when just some of the peer group 
agrees with the subject, even if others disagree, the subject will maintain the correct 
belief rather than conforming with those who disagree. 
 227 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 139. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 139–40. 
 230 Id. at 140. 
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was advocating for it.231  But Lady Mary found an ally in the Princess of 
Wales, Princess Caroline, who was hugely popular at the time.232  
Princess Caroline publicly chose to have variolation performed on her 
children and soon the aristocracy followed, then the doctors, then the 
public.233 
Just as one well-respected individual was able to change the way 
individuals perceived variolation in the 1600s, one well-respected court 
can change the way judges and other individuals perceive legal and 
evidentiary issues.  This Part starts by examining how State v. 
Henderson,234 a New Jersey Supreme Court case on eyewitness 
identification, impacted how eyewitness identification issues are 
perceived and litigated across the United States.  Henderson is an 
exemplar of how a change in one jurisdiction can change norms and the 
conformity problem beyond the court’s jurisdiction.  Then, this Part 
looks at a series of cases from the District of Columbia courts on FTE 
evidence and how the decisions in that jurisdiction moved from an 
acceptance of FTE to evidence-based skepticism.  Finally, two FTE cases 
from a Massachusetts federal court demonstrate how deviations in one 
jurisdiction can have a national impact, even if the local courts do not 
follow. 
A.  New Jersey Identification Cases 
The Henderson decision created a new framework for courts to 
evaluate whether an eyewitness identification is admissible at trial,235 
establishing a higher standard of review than what the U.S. Supreme 
Court devised in Manson v. Brathwaite.236  Since the New Jersey Supreme 
 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 O’CONNOR & WEATHERALL, supra note 153, at 140–41. 
 234 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 235 The Henderson Court rejected the Manson v. Brathwaite test, see discussion infra 
note 236, and instead held that for a defendant to get a hearing on the admissibility of 
an identification, the defendant must merely establish some evidence of suggestiveness, 
which must be tied to a system variable (such as the actions of the state actors).  
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 288–89.  Once a defendant has met this threshold, the burden is 
on the prosecutor to “offer proof to show that the proffered eyewitness identification is 
reliable—accounting for system and estimator variables,” which includes factors 
impacting the witness’s ability to view the suspect and memory.  Id. at 289.  Finally, the 
burden remains on the defendant to prove a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.  Id.  In addition to altering the standard, the Henderson Court 
mandated the creation of a jury instruction that incorporated the social science on 
identifications, which a judge must read in any trial where an identification is at issue.  
Id. at 298–99. 
 236 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).  In Manson, the Court established that 
“reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony” 
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Court issued the Henderson decision in 2011, at least 149 state court 
decisions from outside New Jersey have cited to Henderson.237  In 
addition, 171 law review articles have cited the decision.238  Henderson’s 
impact has extended far beyond the borders of New Jersey.   
The Henderson decision and eyewitness identification case law are 
particularly instructive for the issues relating to admission of forensic 
science evidence: people, including judges, have believed both 
eyewitness identifications and forensic science to be reliable, yet they 
are the most frequent causes of wrongful convictions.  Though issues 
with eyewitness identification have been noted since at least 1932 when 
a Yale University law professor, Edwin Borchard, accounted for almost 
seventy instances of innocent individuals being convicted based on 
erroneous eyewitness identification,239 the uncovering of wrongful 
convictions spurred by the advent of DNA evidence brought to light the 
seriousness of the problem.  As the Henderson Court noted, “Nationwide, 
more than seventy-five percent of convictions overturned due to DNA 
evidence involved eyewitness misidentification. . . .  [I]t has been 
estimated that approximately 7,500 of every 1.5 million annual 
convictions for serious offenses may be based on misidentifications.”240  
In addition, social science research on the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification has been mounting.241  
 
where the defendant alleges that the identification procedure was impermissibly 
suggestive.  Id. at 114.  In determining whether the identification was reliable, the 
defendant must first demonstrate that the identification was impermissibly suggestive, 
and then a court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including opportunity 
to view the suspect, degree of attention, accuracy of any prior description, level of 
certainty at the time of the identification, and the time lapse between the incident and 
the confrontation.  Id.  Unless the circumstances demonstrate “a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” the evidence will be admissible.  Id. at 116 
(internal citation and quotations omitted).   
 237 See Citing References—State v. Henderson, WESTLAW EDGE, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com (search for State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); 
select Citing References tab; and select cases as the content type) (last visited Nov. 13, 
2020).  As of November 13, 2020, New Jersey courts had cited to Henderson in 357 
judicial decisions.  See id.  These numbers do not include trial court orders that are not 
reduced to writing or that are written but not published to Westlaw. 
 238 See Citing References—State v. Henderson, WESTLAW EDGE, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com (search for State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); 
select Citing References tab; and select secondary sources as the content type) (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2020).   
 239 NAT’L RSS. COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 9 
(2014).  
 240 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 886 (N.J. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 241 Id. at 886–88.  See, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness 
Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 475 
(2001) (studying police cases to find that suspect identification rates decrease over 
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Yet, just as forensic science is often persuasive, a witness testifying 
in court, under oath, that the person sitting at the defense table 
committed the alleged offense can have a tremendous impact on a 
jury.242  The conflict between what seems to be reliable based on 
common sense and what science shows us to be reliable is at the heart 
of the slow progress to limit both forensic science testimony and 
eyewitness identification testimony. 
The Henderson decision did not come to be overnight.  Not only did 
the case itself take eight years from the date of the offense to the date of 
the seminal decision but it also built on years of decisions in which the 
New Jersey Supreme Court incrementally incorporated social science 
into its evaluation of the reliability of identifications.  A 1999 case 
mandated that the trial courts read a jury instruction on cross-racial 
bias in eyewitness identification in applicable cases.243  In 2006, the high 
court required police officers to record identification procedures and 
 
time, are significantly greater when the suspect is the same race as the witness, and are 
significantly higher for show ups than lineups); Robert K. Bothwell, John C. Brigham & 
Roy S. Malpass, Cross-Racial Identification, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 19 (1989) 
(finding that memory for faces of the same race as the witness is superior to memory for 
faces of a different race); Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in 
Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCH. 859, 864–65 (2006) (finding that confirming feedback after 
identification caused a witness to inflate their reports of confidence in their 
identification, memory abilities, and conditions at the time of witnessing an event); Lynn 
Garrioch & C.A. Elizabeth Brimacombe, Lineup Administrators’ Expectations: Their 
Impact on Eyewitness Confidence, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 299 (2001) (finding that 
eyewitness’ confidence changes as a function of the lineup administrator’s belief about 
the perpetrator’s identity and that jurors considered identifications equally credible 
regardless of a witness’ level of confidence); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Unconscious 
Transference in Eyewitness Identification, 2 L. & PSYCH. REV. 93 (1976) (finding that 
eyewitnesses to crimes can mistakenly identify a person seen in another context as the 
perpetrator of the crime); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness 
Report, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 560 (1975) (finding that questions asked immediately after 
observing an event can introduce new information that alters the memory of the event); 
Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and 
the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 482 (1981) (finding that the confidence 
of an eyewitness is unrelated to the accuracy of their identification and that biased 
instructions increase the rate of false identifications); Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, 
Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 43 (1989) 
(finding that jurors will judge the accuracy of an identification by the confidence of the 
eyewitness, and the presentation of expert testimony will cause a jury to more carefully 
consider the identification). 
 242 See, e.g., Ralph D. Gants & Erik N. Doughty, Where Science Conflicts with Common 
Sense: Eyewitness Identification Reform in Massachusetts, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1617, 1617 
(2015). 
 243 State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999).  DNA evidence later exonerated 
Mr. Cromedy.  See also C.J. Stuart Rabner, Evaluating Eyewitness Identification Evidence 
in the 21st Century, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (2012). 
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where recordation is infeasible, to prepare a detailed written record.244  
A 2007 case mandated a jury instruction “that a witness’s level of 
confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of 
the identification.”245  These decisions, slowly building upon and 
incorporating relevant social science, culminated in Henderson’s 
overhaul of how eyewitness identification evidence was handled. 
The Henderson case stemmed from a 2003 murder in which a 
witness made an identification from a photo array.246  The identification 
was ultimately admitted at trial, and a jury convicted the defendant.247  
After a defense appeal, the case was remanded in 2008 for further 
hearings on the identification, but the New Jersey Supreme Court 
accepted certification that year, and, after a hearing, requested a special 
hearing on the social science underlying eyewitness identifications.248  
During the ten-day special hearing, the presiding special master heard 
from multiple eyewitness identification experts and issued a 
comprehensive report finding that eyewitnesses can make 
misidentifications under a multitude of circumstances.249  These 
findings were incorporated into the Henderson decision.250  In response 
to the social science, the Court completely changed how identification 
procedures are conducted in New Jersey and evaluated during court 
challenges.251  These significant changes came after eight years of 
litigation and record-building in this case and after decades of litigation 
in New Jersey. 
This landmark decision resulted in almost immediate changes in 
two states: both the Oregon and Idaho high courts issued decisions 
mirroring Henderson within the next two years.252  In 2015, 
 
 244 State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 896–97 (N.J. 2006).  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court recently expanded the ruling in Delgado holding that a hearing on the 
suggestiveness and reliability of an identification procedure is required in any case in 
which the police did not record the procedure.  State v. Anthony, 204 A.3d 229, 241–42 
(N.J. 2019). 
 245 State v. Romero, 922 A.2d 693, 703 (N.J. 2007). 
 246 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 879–80 (N.J. 2011).   
 247 Id. at 879–83. 
 248 Id. at 884. 
 249 Id. at 884–89. 
 250 Id. at 884, 916. 
 251 See supra note 235 (explaining the changes made by the Henderson court).  
 252 Oregon decided State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012), in which it held the same 
factors articulated in Henderson should be applied in Oregon cases, and the trial courts 
should provide detailed jury instructions where an identification was found admissible.  
Id. at 696–97.  In Idaho, the high court decided State v. Almaraz, 301 P.3d 242, 252 
(Idaho 2013), in which it held that lower courts should apply the Henderson factors to 
determine whether the system and estimator variables resulted in an unreliable 
identification. 
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Massachusetts adopted a jury instruction similar to the Henderson 
instruction.253  Alaska changed its approach to eyewitness 
identifications in 2016,254 as did Connecticut in 2018255 when it adopted 
standards mirroring Henderson.  Additionally, several other 
jurisdictions, including New York,256 Wisconsin,257 Utah,258 North 
Carolina,259 District of Columbia,260 Hawaii,261 Illinois,262 Maine,263 
Maryland,264 Pennsylvania,265 and Ohio,266 have implemented changes 
to the way courts evaluate identification procedures, and legislatures 
have made changes to how police officers conduct identification 
procedures.267  Other states have acknowledged that issues exist with 
eyewitness identification procedures, but the courts in those states have 





 253 Gants & Doughty, supra note 242, at 1625–26. 
 254 Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 399 (Alaska 2016). 
 255 State v. Harris, 191 A.3d 119, 142–43 (Conn. 2018).  In Connecticut, similar to New 
Jersey, its high court reviewed identification issues, including the issues Henderson 
raised, several times before it ultimately adopted the Henderson standards.  See State v. 
Johnson, 94 A.3d 1173 (Conn. 2014); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705 (Conn. 2012).  Again, 
incremental change in the courts led to the more substantial overhaul. 
 256 See, e.g., People v. Boone, 91 N.E.3d 1194, 1196 (N.Y. 2017). 
 257 Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls of State Eyewitness Identification 
Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99, 138–46 (2016). 
 258 Id. at 146–49. 
 259 Id. at 150–57. 
 260 In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 295–96, 301 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that trial court 
should have permitted defendant to call an expert of eyewitness identifications because, 
as Henderson illustrated, reliability of identifications is beyond the ken of the average 
juror).  
 261 State v. Kaneaiakala, 450 P.3d 761, 777 (Haw. 2019). 
 262 Though the Illinois courts have not adopted Henderson, they have acknowledged 
that eyewitness identifications are problematic and have permitted expert testimony.  
See People v. Lerma, 47 N.E.3d 985, 997 (Ill. 2016). 
 263 State v. Mahmoud, 147 A.3d 833, 838–39 (Me. 2016). 
 264 Small v. State, 211 A.3d 236, 246–47 (Md. 2019) (holding that while the court was 
not adopting Henderson, courts can consider the Henderson factors as part of the analysis 
of the admissibility of an identification). 
 265 Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 781, 792–93 (Pa. 2014) (permitting 
experts in eyewitness identification because of the social science research as articulated 
in Henderson). 
 266 Kahn-Fogel, supra note 257, at 150–57. 
 267 See generally id. at 120.  
 268 See, e.g., State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2017); People v. Sanchez, 941 
N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679 (R.I. 2016). 
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This is not to say that Henderson fixed how all courts review 
eyewitness identifications.  The federal courts and many states still 
apply the Manson v. Brathwaite test,269 and of those states that have 
changed their legal standards, many courts are still reluctant to find 
identification procedures improper even if they did not follow the 
recommended standards.270  Nevertheless, the Henderson opinion is less 
than a decade old and already five states have almost fully adopted the 
decision, eleven states have substantially changed their approaches to 
eyewitness identification, and at least three more are aware of the 
problems and acknowledge that social science raises doubts on the 
reliability of the evidence.  The consensus among the courts is moving 
toward the belief that eyewitness identification is not always reliable. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court is particularly receptive to applying 
developments in social science to the law, such that this type of decision 
likely could not have originated from just any jurisdiction.  Despite the 
uniqueness of the New Jersey Supreme Court, jurisdictions throughout 
the country adopted its approach to eyewitness identifications.  The way 
in which the Henderson decision has changed how courts approach 
eyewitness identification exemplifies the reversibility of the conformity 
problem: the social science research was there long before Henderson, 
defense attorneys were challenging this evidence long before 
Henderson, but it took Henderson for other courts to resist conforming 
with the norm and change admissibility standards.271 
In addition, because New Jersey undertook the heavy lift of the 
multi-day hearings with multiple experts, other courts were able to 
adopt the research and reasoning without having to conduct the cost-
intensive hearings themselves; the record was already developed and 
one barrier to deviation was removed.   
 
 269 See supra note 236 (explaining the Manson v. Brathwaite test).  See, e.g., State v. 
Doap Deng Chuol, 849 N.W.2d 255, 261 (S.D. 2014); Monroe v. State, 28 A.3d 418, 431 
(Del. 2011) (citing a Delaware state court case that adopts Manson); State v. Gross, 776 
N.E.2d 1061, 1076 (Ohio 2002); State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 912 (Minn. 1996); State 
v. Sanchez, 288 P.3d 351, 378 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 195 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (referring to the Biggers factors).  Some courts refer to this test 
as the Biggers test as the factors considered under Manson were adopted from Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198–99 (1972).   
 270 Kahn-Fogel, supra note 257, at 102. 
 271 See discussion supra note 226.  Just as in that study where subjects were willing 
to resist conformity when just one person agreed with them, courts were able to resist 
conformity when they saw the New Jersey Supreme Court rule consistent with their own 
conclusions. 
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B.  District of Columbia Cases 
The FTE litigation in the District of Columbia Superior Court and 
the attendant Court of Appeals decisions demonstrate how one judge’s 
repeated assertions that judges should apply Daubert more strictly to 
forensic science resulted in one of the most restrictive decisions on FTE 
expert testimony.  Though this litigation is still ongoing and developing, 
there has been substantial movement in the way judges are treating 
forensic science evidence.  In August 2019, Judge Edelman ruled in 
United States v. Tibbs “that the government’s expert witness must limit 
his testimony to a conclusion that, based on his examination of the 
evidence and the consistency of the class characteristics and 
microscopic toolmarks, the firearm cannot be excluded as the source of 
the casing.”272  Though the court did not exclude the testimony, the 
expert will merely be permitted to testify that the recovered firearm 
cannot be excluded from being the source of the casing.   
The Tibbs decision, however, did not come out of nowhere; it builds 
upon decisions over the previous years that slowly but steadily created 
change.  In 2011, the D.C. Court of Appeals examined a case in which the 
defendant requested a Frye hearing on the testimony of the FTE 
examiner, which was denied, and then the defendant failed to object at 
trial to the examiner testifying that he was “100%” certain of his findings 
“to the exclusion of all other firearms.”273  On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals reviewed the testimony regarding certainty and stated, “[W]e 
will assume, without deciding, that [FTE] experts should not be 
permitted to testify that they are 100% certain of a match, to the 
exclusion of all other firearms.”274  The Court of Appeals did not decide 
the issue because the U.S. Attorney’s Office had stated that its policy “is 
to have firearms experts qualify their conclusions to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty,” not unqualified certainty.275 
This decision, though not explicitly ruling on the issue, opened the 
door to challenges to FTE testimony, because though the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office insisted its experts would not testify with unqualified certainty, 
 
 272 United States v. Tibbs, No. 2016 CF1 19431, 2019 D.C. Super. LEXIS 9, at *2 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2019).  This ruling was based on the court’s finding that “reliable 
principles permit a conclusion that a firearm cannot be excluded as the source of a 
recovered casing or bullet; indeed, this limited conclusion is supported by the reliable 
principle that firearms leave toolmark impressions on discharged cartridge casings and 
the reliable method of viewing those impressions under a comparison microscope.”  Id. 
at *76–77. 
 273 Jones v. United States, 27 A.3d 1130, 1135 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 274 Id. at 1139. 
 275 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that is exactly what the expert did in United States v. Williams.276  In that 
case, however, the defense attorney again failed to object to the FTE 
examiner’s testimony that he had no “doubt in [his] mind” that the 
recovered bullets came from the relevant firearm and provided 
additional unqualified certainty statements.277  Despite this testimony, 
which went against the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s stated policy, the Court 
of Appeals held that this was not plain error.278 
Concurring in this opinion, however, Judge Easterly, citing the NAS 
Report as well as the Ballistic Imaging Report, among other publications, 
laid the foundation for challenges to FTE: 
[T]here is only one permissible answer to the question left 
undecided in Jones regarding firearms and toolmark 
examiners’ assertions of certainty in their pattern-matching 
conclusions: the District of Columbia courts should not allow 
them.  It is well established that expert opinion evidence is 
admissible if ‘it will not mislead the jury and will prove useful 
in understanding the facts in issue.’  Certainty statements such 
as those elicited by the government in this case are misleading 
and lack any legitimate utility in criminal trials; they express 
a solid statistical foundation for individualization that does 
not currently (and may never) exist.279 
Judge Easterly goes on to connect these issues with the wrongful 
convictions that have come from areas of pattern-matching forensic 
science.280 
Shortly after Williams, two cases substantially changed the 
landscape in D.C.: Gardner v. United States281 and Motorola, Inc.  v. 
Murray.282  In Gardner, a case where the defense did object to unqualified 
certainty statements from the FTE examiner, the Court of Appeals held 
that “in this jurisdiction a firearms and toolmark expert may not give an 
unqualified opinion, or testify with absolute or 100% certainty, that 
based on ballistics pattern comparison matching a fatal shot was fired 
from one firearm, to the exclusion of all other firearms.”283  Then, in 
Motorola, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District of Columbia would 
 
 276 Williams v. United States, 130 A.3d 343, 346 (D.C. 2016). 
 277 Id.  
 278 Id. at 348. 
 279 Id. at 353–54 (Easterly, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 280 Id. at 354–55. 
 281 Gardner v. United States, 140 A.3d 1172 (D.C. 2016). 
 282 Motorola, Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016). 
 283 Gardner, 140 A.3d at 1184.  It is worth noting that despite the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office’s assertion that it has a policy of not eliciting unqualified statements of certainty 
during such testimony, the examiner, again, made a statement of unqualified certainty.  
Id. at 1182. 
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no longer be a Frye jurisdiction, but rather a Daubert jurisdiction.284  In 
that matter, Judge Easterly, again in a concurrence, placed the focus on 
the admission of forensic science evidence and urged trial courts to 
make use of the NAS Report and PCAST Report in evaluating forensic 
science in criminal cases.285 
Finally, as the motion to exclude or limit the testimony of the FTE 
examiner in Tibbs was pending, the Court of Appeals issued a new 
decision in United States v. Williams.286  Revising its earlier decision 
based on these subsequent decisions, the Court of Appeals held that the 
admission of the unqualified testimony regarding the “match” was plain 
error.287 
This series of cases illustrates how a change in a single judge, or a 
small group of judges, can result in more widespread change.  Over the 
course of several years, Court of Appeals judges began questioning the 
efficacy of permitting FTE experts to testify with unqualified certainty, 
ultimately concluding that it was impermissible.  That decision, along 
with the concurrence in Motorola urging judges to follow the NAS 
Report and PCAST Report, created the perfect climate for Judge Edelman 
to issue his decision in Tibbs. 
In the District of Columbia, blind acceptance of FTE is no longer the 
only way in which judges are evaluating this evidence—the high court 
is pushing trial courts to critically evaluate the proposed experts.  As the 
trajectory of the cases makes clear, though, the changes were made 
slowly.  Not until 2016, seven years after the NAS Report, did the Court 
of Appeals explicitly prohibit FTE examiners from testifying to 
unqualified certainty.  Regardless, simply by establishing two ways to 
approach this evidence (the old way and the new way), pressure to 
conform to the old way has substantially lost influence.   
C.  District of Massachusetts Cases 
In contrast, what looked like promising developments in the 
District of Massachusetts did not result in any widespread change in that 
jurisdiction, though they have influenced other jurisdictions and 
scholars.  In 2005 and 2006, Judge Gertner and Judge Saris issued 
 
 284 Murray, 147 A.3d at 758–59. 
 285 Id. at 759–60 (Easterly, J., concurring). 
 286 See Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 736 (D.C. 2019) (granting a rehearing 
because the Williams matter was not finalized when the D.C. Court of Appeals rendered 
the Motorola and Gardner decisions). 
 287 Id.  
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decisions within a month of each other criticizing FTE evidence.288  
These decisions came before any of the reports detailing the problems 
with FTE.  Both decisions are often cited in law review articles;289 
however, since 2005, only seven cases within Massachusetts have cited 
to United States v. Green.  Apart from United States v. Monteiro, none of 
the decisions critiqued or limited testimony involving FTE.290  Monteiro 
has only been cited in seven decisions, and none critiqued or limited 
testimony involving FTE.291  Green and Monteiro were groundbreaking 
 
 288 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 104, 106, 109 (D. Mass. 2005) 
(opinion issued by Judge Gertner); see also United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 
351, 351, 354–55 (D. Mass. 2006) (opinion issued by Judge Saris). 
 289 See, e.g., Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An 
“Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 299 (2007); Brandon L. 
Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, The Proficiency of Experts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 940 n.165 
(2018); Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 68 CASE W. RES. 869, 910–11 
(2018); Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating Crime Laboratories: The Impact of DNA Evidence, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 59, 92 (2008); Jennifer Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the 
Forensic Sciences, 58  UCLA L. REV. 725, 759 (2011).  Green has been cited in 73 law review 
articles in total.  Citing References—United States v. Green, WESTLAW EDGE, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/ (search for 405 F.Supp.2d 104; select Citing References 
tab; and select secondary sources as the content type) (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).  
Monteiro has been cited in 41 law review articles Citing References—United States v. 
Monteiro, WESTLAW EDGE, https://1.next.westlaw.com/ (search for 407 F. Supp. 2d 351; 
select Citing References tab; and select secondary sources as the content type) (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2020).   
 290 With the exception of Monteiro, no case cited to Green in the context of FTE.  See 
Josiah v. Rodrigues, No. 16-11986-FDS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44434, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 
27, 2017) (citing petitioner’s use of Green in application for leave to obtain further 
appellate review but rejecting the federal claim where petitioner had failed to exhaust 
state claims); Logan v. Gelb, 52 F. Supp. 3d 122, 135 (D. Mass. 2014) (citing Green as an 
example of a court finding a law enforcement officer was not qualified to testify as an 
expert); BASF Corp. v. Sublime Restorations, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 205, 212 (D. Mass. 
2012) (citing Green to quote Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. in a breach of contract claim); 
United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 113–14 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to move for a Daubert hearing on any expert witness 
testimony and citing Green for its limitation on the ultimate conclusion of an expert 
witness); Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 215 (D. Mass. 
2009) (permitting an expert to testify without reaching an ultimate conclusion and 
citing Green as an example); United States v. Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d 152, 169 (D. Mass. 
2006) (citing Green in rejecting testimony of an expert whose “conclusions assert a level 
of certainty unjustified by his methodology and experience”); United States v. Monteiro, 
407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364 n.1 (D. Mass. 2006) (see discussion supra section IV.C). 
 291 Only one case cited to Monteiro in the context of FTE at all.  See United States v. 
Nascimento, No. 03-10329-PBS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95355, at *7 (D. Mass. Oct. 9, 2009) 
(citing Monteiro for the principle that FTE expert testimony should only be admitted 
after a Daubert hearing and with proper limitation); In re Pharm. Indus. Average 
Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d 20, 85 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Monteiro in a class 
action against drug manufacturers to explain the court’s gatekeeping function); Hearts 
On Fire Co., LLC v. Circa, Inc., No. 14-cv-11044-DLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160872, at 
*16–17 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2017) (citing Monteiro to quote Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. 
in a breach of contract claim); Rivera v. City of Worcester, No. 12-40066-TSH, 2014 U.S. 
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for their time, but their impact on other judges within the district or 
state has been minimal—the conformity problem persists in 
Massachusetts.   
The Green decision, until the final holding, reads as though the FTE 
testimony is going to be altogether excluded.  Judge Gertner first noted 
that the expert did not take any notes or photographs of the 
comparisons he did, and when asked how he decides which marks are 
considered class versus subclass versus individualized, the FTE 
examiner admitted that he does not have any studies or databases on 
which he relies for making such a determination.292  The decision goes 
on to note a lack of error rate studies, as well as a lack of peer review in 
the specific instance of this case and the field generally.293 
After pages of a scalding indictment of FTE, Judge Gertner 
addressed the issue that most plagues these judges: precedent.  Even 
acknowledging that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which is 
binding on her court, had not ruled on the issue of FTE post-Daubert,294 
and that trial courts have the discretion to include or exclude this 
testimony, Judge Gertner found the nonbinding precedent too 
persuasive.  As she noted in her decision, no court, even post-Daubert, 
had excluded FTE evidence.295  In the end, she permitted the FTE 
witness to testify, but prohibited him from concluding (for which he has 
no substantiation) that the casings were a match to “the exclusion of all 
other guns.”296 
Shortly thereafter, Judge Saris issued her decision in State v. 
Monteiro.297  Monteiro differs from Green in that Monteiro analyzed FTE 
and the AFTE method generally, found it a sound methodology, but then 
found that the expert in that particular case should not be permitted to 
testify unless and until he complied with the AFTE method.  Judge Saris 
 
Dist. LEXIS 82937, at *6–8 (D. Mass. June 17, 2014) (citing Monteiro in a hearing to 
preclude opinion testimony of law enforcement officers to describe the court’s 
requirement to exercise its gatekeeping function on a case-by-case basis and to quote 
Daubert and Kumho Tire Co.); Sublime Restorations, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (D. Mass. 
2012) (quoting Monteiro in a breach of contract claim to note that the burden of proof 
is on the proponent of the evidence); McGovern v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 584 F. 
Supp. 2d 418, 424 (D. Mass. 2008) (citing Monteiro in a medical malpractice case to 
explain the court’s gatekeeping function); Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 158–59, 162–63 
(D. Mass. 2006) (citing Monteiro in a Daubert hearing about the admissibility of forensic 
examination of photographic evidence to explain the gatekeeping function and burden 
of proof). 
 292 Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 113, 114 n.19. 
 293 Id. at 116. 
 294 Id. at 123. 
 295 Id. at 122–23. 
 296 Id. at 124. 
 297 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 351 (D. Mass. 2006).   
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was less critical in her analysis than Judge Gertner, and though noting 
that FTE does not have error rates, found that “there is no evidence that 
the tests are inaccurate or otherwise deficient.”298  Nevertheless, Judge 
Saris’s decision is notable in that she limited the expert’s testimony 
(should he come into compliance with the AFTE method): he would not 
be able to testify to any statistical certainty that the firearm is the source 
of particular markings on a casing, but he would be able to testify to “a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.”299 
Reading through these decisions, particularly Judge Gertner’s 
decision, one can see her interest in the area of forensic science and her 
desire to prevent junk science from getting to the courtroom.300  Then, 
Judge Saris relied on her colleague’s earlier decision on this very issue 
before reaching her own conclusion to limit FTE testimony.301  However, 
even with their predispositions to look at FTE testimony with a critical 
eye, both judges could not overcome the conformity problem: that every 
prior judicial decision on FTE held this evidence admissible.  Judge 
Gertner stated in her decision: 
This reliance on long-standing use of ballistics evidence in the 
courts is troubling.  It runs the risk of ‘grandfathering in 
irrationality,’ without reexamining it in the light of Kumho and 
Daubert.  It arguably ignores the mandate of Daubert, 
especially where the courts are relying on pre-Daubert 
acceptance of a given scientific technique.302  
 
 298 Id. at 367–68.  Note that under Daubert, the burden is on the proponent to 
establish that the method is reliable, not on the opposition to establish that it is not 
reliable.  See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (holding that the 
proponent of evidence has the burden of establishing preliminary facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence). 
 299 Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 372.  This distinction appears to have significance to 
courts as judges perceive this limitation as a true limitation on the witness’s ability to 
state an opinion.  But whether this distinction has an impact on jurors is questionable.  
See generally, Danielle Weiss & Gerald Laporte, Uncertainty Ahead: A Shift in How Federal 
Scientific Experts Can Testify, NAT’L INST. JUST. J, Apr. 2018, at 71, 73 (discussing a change 
in DOJ policy that experts should not be permitted to testify to a “degree of scientific 
certainty” because such a statement can be misleading to jurors and has no basis in 
science). 
 300 Judge Gertner had previously issued a similar decision in United States v. Hines, 55 
F. Supp. 2d 62, 70–71 (D. Mass. 1999), in which she limited the testimony of a 
handwriting expert and the degree to which that expert could testify about certainty.  
Thus, she was already interested and engaged in the issues of forensic science and 
whether such expert testimony should reach a jury post-Daubert.  
 301 See Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 373. 
 302 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 123 (D. Mass. 2005). 
KRONICK (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2020  11:28 AM 
642 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:589 
This reads as though she is about to strongly limit the expert testimony, 
but then she only prohibitted him from claiming his opinion is “to the 
exclusion of all other guns.”303 
Judges Gertner and Saris were ahead of the curve, writing years 
before the comprehensive reports were even released.  These two 
decisions have continued to influence judges, academics, and advocates.  
Again, demonstrating that though changing one judge’s perception of 
FTE might not change everything, it is part of a movement to slowly 
change the norm and confront the conformity problem. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Since the mid-2000s, multiple reports and exonerations have 
demonstrated the risks of admitting forensic science without 
adequately ensuring that the evidence is reliable or sufficiently reliable 
to go before a jury.  Nonetheless, judges have continued to admit this 
evidence.  Even if a judge is cautious enough to craft a limitation on the 
presentation of evidence, that limitation rarely has a functional meaning 
to a jury; will a jury really understand the difference between 100% 
certainty and ballistic certainty?  A path toward creating pressure on 
judges to make real and substantive changes is essential to ensuring that 
the number of wrongful convictions decreases and that our criminal 
legal system has integrity. 
Many barriers stand between the current norm and substantial 
change in how judges evaluate forensic science: cognitive biases, 
decades of bad decisions based on faulty evidence, pressures to 
conform, strongly held beliefs, and prosecutors providing misleading 
information.  The economic analysis would seem to tilt strongly toward 
this norm of admitting the evidence never changing.  But there are 
judges in the mold of Judge Skelly Wright, who, for a variety of reasons, 
will be willing to push beyond these barriers and issue decisions 
substantially limiting or excluding forensic science evidence that is not 
foundationally valid.  For these judges, the cost of conforming is far more 
than the cost of deviating. 
Not all (or even close to all) judges are willing to deviate from a 
clearly held norm, but not all judges need to be in order to change the 
conformity problem.  As the Henderson case and District of Columbia 
cases demonstrate, once a single court deviates from the norm, more 
will follow.  The early challengers to conformity serve as anchors, and 
other judges can then issue their decisions knowing they are not 
standing alone. 
 
 303 Id. at 124. 
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Why some judges are more likely to become these anchors than 
others remains elusive.  In the context of forensic science, it may be that 
the judge has a particular curiosity when it comes to evidentiary and 
forensic science issues, that she is a former defense attorney who has 
previously made such challenges, or that she is a former prosecutor who 
wants to ensure that evidence used in criminal trials is without 
reproach.  Whatever the reason, giving judges the tools to critically 
analyze forensic science is essential; if the judge is unaware of the 
problem, they will not be part of the change.  Thus, judicial trainings, 
strategic litigation, and advocacy on and publicity of these issues are 
essential and time sensitive.  The continued use of unreliable evidence 
in criminal cases is against our values.  But more importantly, it results 
in real people spending real time in prisons, away from their families 
and societies, halting their lives, when they are innocent.  This must 
change. 
 
